

TURKEY

KEY TO THE EAST

by Chester M. Tobin

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

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*This book
is affectionately dedicated
to my wife
but for whom it never
would have been written.*

Turkish Names and Places

Simply for clarity American spelling of Turkish words and names has been employed. In cases where names were changed during the language reform and in other cases where family names were taken after 1935, an effort has been made by parenthetical explanation to avoid the confusion of the use of two different names.

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INTRODUCTION

Pride and Prejudice—a Reappraisal

THE EUROPEAN CLICHÉ of the "Terrible Turk" had been sharply imprinted on the minds of Americans by the close of the First World War. It was cast in human baseness. The purposes of the Western World had required this pattern of hate and fear as a psychological weapon of war. After the war, when I had returned to complete my college education, an Armenian woman addressed our college assembly and told in graphic language of the atrocious Armenian massacres and how she, herself, had been outraged and raped innumerable times by the despicable Turks. My youthful blood literally boiled as I listened to this sordid story. The perpetrators were scarcely human beings. They deserved no quarter.

I was indoctrinated with the pattern, along with all college youth and even the general American public. This cliché of the "Terrible Turk" was exploited to coerce the churches to support the war and the insidious campaign to get the United States to take a mandate over a section of Turkey that was to be made a free state of Armenia. No one I knew seemed to understand that it was serving the unrevealed, selfish interests of the European Allied Powers.

My pride had been enhanced by a five months' service record as a commissioned officer, though I never had been closer to the battle fronts in France than Valparaiso, Indiana. I championed Wilson's Fourteen Points. I was convinced that Americans like myself must solve the world's problems in my lifetime. The Armenian massacres lent themselves perfectly to emotional orating. As the college orator, I played them for all they were worth. "Americans must redeem themselves, fulfill their God-given destiny and save the remaining, defenseless, Christian Armenians from the murderous Turks by assuming a protective mandate over Armenia." That was my theme and my conviction.

Added to pride, prejudice and ambition was the golden opportunity of the early twenties—rebuilding the world. My path, by fortuitous circumstances and ironical coincidence, led directly to Turkey in 1924. I was the one chosen for the new Turkish government to coach its first track and field team ever to compete in the Olympics. Now I could participate directly in the American ambition to remake the world and particularly the Turk into what Americans thought he ought to be.

My spoon-fed theories quickly collapsed. A finer group of young men could not be found anywhere in the world than the group I found expectantly waiting their American coach on the field at Kadekuy. They were eager, ambitious, courteous gentlemen. They revealed a people who had been deliberately maligned in the interests of political, religious and military expediency. It was a rude but delightful disillusionment. The parents of these boys and the government officials with whom I co-operated impressed me still more favorably. Here were the ingredients of the new Turkey that was arising. They were respect-

human beings. They were capable and their eyes were from the West whence I had come. America was a somewhat magical country to them because of the exaggerated sense of our democracy, advancement and drive. They had become acquainted with these "Terrible Turks" before I realized the potentialities of these countrymen. I met the great revolutionary hero Mustafa Kemal Pasha, as they then called him. But my exuberance about the Turks was instantly slapped down by the old-timers. They rebuked me firmly, "You're young. You will learn."

Returning to Istanbul from Paris after the Olympic Games, I had the annoying and embarrassing experience of stopping and running short of cash in Brindisi on the Italian boot of Italy. I inquired for an American Exchange Office, the usual financial oasis for American tourists in Europe. Fortunately for me there was one. Finding the office I entered with misgivings, wondering how I could persuade the manager to cash my personal check for dollars. I met him and started to explain my predicament, telling him that I had been the American coach who had coached the First Turkish Olympic Track and Field team and was returning to Istanbul from the Games in

He immediately became interested and started to ask me about the Turks. This was all the opening I needed. I proceeded to educate this American to the real merits of the Turks. I hurled out my stories of my experiences and impressions with the abandon of one who feels he has finally reached the truth. The manager listened with rapt attention as I made my enthusiastic case. Finally when I finished he smiled as he said, "I have been impressed with you. You think of the Turks BECAUSE I FOUGHT AGAINST THEM AT GALLIPOLI." I had not recog-

nized my adopted pupil of the moment as a Britisher! And here was I telling him about the Turks he had fought against in one of the war's bloodiest battles.

Amazingly enough, this veteran of Gallipoli went on to reassure me of his kindred respect, admiration and hopes for the Turks, and said, "I think that the Turkish soldier is the squarest of all the soldiers of Europe. His front line warfare and his treatment of our prisoners were highly honorable." I was learning also my early lessons about those doughty British who command my unbounded admiration for their thoroughness in understanding the world and their position in it.

Back in the city of Constantinople, renamed Istanbul, it was the common assertion, heard by me frequently in 1924 and 1925, that the new Nationalist government in Ankara could not possibly succeed. These revolutionary leaders were military men and had no comprehension of the problems of national economy, finance and foreign trade. To the old-timers (Americans, British and other foreigners) who presumed to know all about the Turks, it was ridiculous to think that Turks could be successful as bankers, businessmen or industrialists. Such skills were supposed to be totally beyond them. Any newcomer (like myself) who manifested any confidence was held in derision for misguided enthusiasm. It is interesting to recall a thrice-renewed bet between two colleagues in 1924-25 of a box of choice cigars that Kamal (then Mustafa Kemal) and his regime would be out within three months. Although the cocksure old-timer lost three boxes of cigars in the course of nine months and finally broke off the bet, he never changed his mind up to the time of his departure from Turkey.

Gratifying confirmation of my confidence in the Turk-

ish people has been made in these past twenty years. I came to know the finer characteristics and the worthy national ambitions of the Turks. I associated with them for years. I learned their language. I believe I understand in fair measure their problems and their desires. I personally like the Turks. I thrill at their remarkable resurgence to become a great nation.

Since my first return from Turkey in 1927, I have been endeavoring to portray to Americans the real Turks and their vibrant progressive nation. Now, more than ever, I feel there is need for a clear, concise, historical picture of the old Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. An accurate interpretation of Turkey's position in the maelstrom swirling about this two-continent nation is essential to all Americans thinking and warring globally today. It can contribute to the solution of that portion of our world jigsaw puzzle. It can help to piece together the average American's jumble of truth and fiction about Turkey into the picturesque, important pattern that it is.

TURKEY

KEY TO THE EAST

CHAPTER ONE

Ottoman Panorama

A BLOODY PATH crosses and recrosses Asia Minor, a path that goes back nearly six thousand years. On the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, archeologists have dug into the ancient ruins that once were Troy. In deep Anatolia, buried and long unnoticed mine entrances, made countless centuries ago, indicate a knowledge of metals and their usage by forgotten peoples. Western tourists have stumbled around in the overgrown ruins of a once thriving city on the Mediterranean, now miles removed from the sea by swampy, silted soil. Their curiosity is that of all Christians, for they know that from this bygone city of Ephesus went the Apostle Paul, destined by his mission to make Christianity the religion of the Western World.

Roumeli and Anadouli Hissars are the crumbling stone fortifications on each side of the Bosphorus that mark the days the Osmanli Turks placed their strangle hold across that narrow, placid waterway, to seize control of the trade, and later, wrest the majestic city of Constantinople from Byzantine decay. Toppled, weather-beaten tombstones, under age-old cypresses, looking down on the Golden Horn, are fragmentary reminders of the heroes of another period. Across the Bosphorus from the Golden

Horn on the Asiatic shore, called Scutari, white crosses mark the graves of some of the British who gave their lives in the Crimean War. Near by is also hallowed ground, for on it stood the hospital barracks where Florence Nightingale pioneered her inestimable service to humanity.

That great old capital of Constantine and later of the Ottoman Sultans is viewed in all its grandeur of ages from ships on the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora. There are the tall, graceful minarets of the mosques, architectural masterpieces designed and built to inspire and guide the souls of men. There are the marble palaces of powerful rulers of the past, gorgeous in the sunlight. Down the sloping hills to the water's edge are piled the fascinating, colorful residences of the polyglot inhabitants. Ashore, the grandeur is lost in the musty, stifling atmosphere of centuries of accumulation. Khojas and priests, soldiers and civilians, merchants and bankers, beggars and hawkers, all races, all nationalities, all creeds, teem over the narrow walks into the cobblestoned streets.

History may seem mystifying, the present hopeless, and the future baffling, but recall the would-be world conquerors from Alexander the Great to Hitler. Recount the empires of history that rose and fell from the Hellenic to the Ottoman. All had their ambitions and their interests focused on this strategic area, the "crossroads of the world," where the land route between Europe and Asia is intersected by the water route from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. It was the key to the conquerors going west out of Asia. It was the key to the larger number of conquerors going east out of Europe. It is the key to the East today.

Of this sixty centuries' trek of humanity, the Ottoman

panorama covers but seven centuries, and modern Turkey less than a quarter of a century.

The people from whom descended the Ottoman Turkish leadership were a band of war refugees fleeing the scourges of the top ranking, murderous conqueror, Ghenghis Khan. They probably did not number more than a few thousand sorely pressed people. These pitiful remnants of the skilled horsemen of the nomadic tribe of Turks, who had roamed the mountains, valleys and deserts of Khorasan in Central Asia, pushed their way into Asia Minor. The temporary rulers there were the Seljuk Turks, and they too were sorely smitten by the Mongul hordes of Khan. A critical battle was about to be fought, in which the Seljuks were outnumbered and certain to be beaten. Led by their Ertoghrul Bey, the refugee horsemen rushed into the fray on the side of the Seljuks, and the day was won. They were rewarded with a fief in the western central part of Asia Minor, near the present capital of modern Turkey, Ankara. Ertoghrul Bey lived to a great old age, loyal to the Seljuks. His son Osman (also spelled Othman) succeeded him.

Shortly after Osman became Bey, anarchy spread over the Seljukian realms under a weak, incapable Sultan. Quickly Osman moved in to take control. Within two decades he had much of Asia Minor under his rule. His accession to power had been achieved with little bloodshed. The diverse peoples residing in Anatolia were accustomed to changing conquerors and accepted the rule of Osman without opposition worthy of the name. Even the weakly held areas of Byzantium, in Asia Minor, yielded without much fighting, and Osman now is called the first Sultan descended from war refugees of Khorasan. From

Osman the people of Anatolia took the distinctive name, Ottoman.

Osman died in 1326, just ninety-nine years after the world had been relieved of Genghis Khan. Thirty years later, Osman's son Orhan crossed the Dardanelles to extend Ottoman power into Europe. Within a century the Ottoman Empire created by the skilled and fortunate leadership of a small band of war refugees had become a menace to Europe. In the next two centuries it was to spread its conquests into the heart of Europe, throughout southwestern Asia, and across North Africa, nearly to the Atlantic Ocean. Thus, within three centuries, the mighty tide of the Ottoman Empire rose to its crest sweeping over parts of three continents. There for nearly two centuries it was to hold. Then for another two centuries it was to ebb, while jealous crosscurrents of several conflicting tides of national imperialism were rising in Europe.

Character traits of this Ottoman Empire changed with its life cycle. Its Sultans, in the years of growth, were brave warriors leading their forces into battle, mighty by right of their courageous and wise leadership. Ertoghrul led his horsemen against the Monguls. Orhan led his army across the Dardanelles into Europe. Mehmet II, the Sultan to capture Constantinople, ascended the throne at the age of twenty-one. He was a warrior of the first order. When that mighty victory over the long defended fortress city was finally achieved he rode triumphantly at the head of his troops. Even the aged Suleiman the Magnificent, Sultan of the Empire at its zenith, ventured forth to battle at the age of seventy-two. In faraway Hungary he directed the siege of the fort of Szigetvar and died there.

This was the character of the conquering Sultans. But

the Empire had reached its peak, rich and powerful. The Sultans lived more and more lavishly in their marble palaces. They placed more and more of the responsibilities of conquest and rule in the hands of their underlings. Suleiman the Magnificent was succeeded by his son Selim the Sot. The name indicates the change, and during his reign the first real European defeat was scored against the Ottoman Empire, the naval battle of Lepanto. Palace intrigues, corruption, terror and beastly crimes marked the decadence which came in to ruin the internal structure of the Empire. From the time of Selim the Sot the palace rulers with few exceptions were dissolute, debauched individuals. Sultans were not the warriors or the rulers of old but palace weaklings and degenerates seeking worldly pleasure in contradiction to their religion and the simple, disciplined life of the faithful of Islam.

More and more foreign blood (chiefly Western) came into the ruling Ottoman household through the large harems of the Sultans. Murad III had an inordinately large harem even for a Sultan, and Turkish sources credit him with having more than a hundred children. One of his harem, a Venetian prostitute of the lowest order, named Baffo, helped considerably in setting the lower standards of life of the ruling house of Osman. To the jealous intrigues of the palace women must be attributed much of the Ottoman decadence. When Sultan Osman II tried to eliminate harem life and to marry an educated daughter of one of his ministers he was killed by his guards who were in turn serving the selfish interests of the women of the palace. Mehmet III had nineteen of his brothers murdered, fearing they might attempt to murder him for the throne. Generally, thereafter, the prospective heirs to

the throne were prisoners within the palace, given little training for the responsibilities they were later to try to assume as Sultan.

Graft and bribery, known as "backshish," took vicious hold on all public offices. One Sultan's reign was commonly known as "the sable period," indicating the chief form of graft taken in his day. Wider and wider became the gulf between the Ottoman reigning clique and the hardy, honest and simple Turkish people. Practically all Western writers on Turkey failed to perceive this cleavage, or to make a distinction between the rot and degradation of the ruling class and the mass of disciplined, rugged peasant folk that were the real Turks.

A mighty force in the forging of the Empire was the Janissary system. It helped in building and later in greatly weakening Ottoman power. It was the unique system developed by the Ottomans to give them the most efficient, powerful, civil and military regimes devised by any conquering and ruling group up to that time. The British and the Germans have learned, and applied, many phases of the system to their advantage. Again most Western writers have stressed the faults of the method of recruiting the Janissaries and neglected the significance of expertly training the best talent of the Empire for its service.

The Janissaries were recruited exclusively from selected healthy boys (aged five to seven) of Christian parentage. Those selected were taken away from their villages, and their family ties were completely severed. They grew up not knowing who their parents were and not privileged to marry. At first, parents tried devious methods to avoid having their sons selected, resorting even to mutilation. Then, later, many parents strove to secure the selection of

their sons, convinced that this service offered them their greatest opportunity in life.

These boy recruits were immediately sent to schools to receive training under the most skilled teachers of their day. Nothing was neglected in perfecting them for the responsibilities with which they were to be entrusted. After early training they were divided into two groups, one to be trained for civil government, the other for war. Emphasis has always been placed on the latter group, called the Janissaries.

The Janissaries were members of a privileged group. They were trained to be fanatical followers of Mohammed and to believe that immediate entrance into paradise awaited them if they died on the battlefield. They moved into battle as soldiers of the crescent, convinced it was their duty to conquer infidels in the name of Allah. When misfortune, sickness or injury befell them they were well cared for. They were the heroes of the Empire, and they were treated as such. Through their invincibility on the battlefield came vast conquests in three continents. The name Janissary struck terror into the hearts of their enemies. They were the professional soldiers, par excellence.

With power, success, and glory came decadence in the Janissary system. First the Janissaries secured the right to marry and have families. Then came the struggle to secure places of rank for their children, regardless of merit. The rigid system broken, the Janissaries now threatened the power of the throne. While debauchery and degeneration decreased the strength of the Sultans the usurpation of more and more privileges by the Janissaries wrought havoc in the machinery of government. They dethroned and murdered Sultan Selim III when he attempted reforms.

They tried unsuccessfully to kill his heir to the throne. Grand Viziers were deposed, wars were declared, and peace negotiated by the Janissaries.

During the rise of the Empire, when the Janissaries were such an efficient fighting unit, they numbered from twenty to fifty thousand. In 1648 they were reduced to only 17,000. But from that time on they increased in number, and then mainly native Turks of fifteen to sixteen years of age were recruited to fill their ranks. The careful training once given was dropped for economy purposes. No longer were the Janissaries keen for wars of conquest. Defeat seemed to face them on the battlefields. The Sultan's treasury and the people became their victims instead of booty from wars. Each new Sultan had to pay the "caste" an accession tribute of not less than two and one-half million ducats. Though only 25,000 were in actual military service, over 400,000, according to one Turkish authority, were bleeding the country in one way or another by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Small wonder Sultan Mahmud II undertook to train a new and separate army to cope with them. The Janissaries replied by killing, burning and looting. Loyal troops were turned against them. Their barracks were burned to the ground, and Janissaries were killed wherever found. Those captured alive were hanged. On June 10th, 1826, over one hundred thousand were slaughtered, and the Janissary scourge was wiped out.

In appraising the changes that came in the Ottoman life cycle, full cognizance must be given to the static, handicapping grip the organized forces of Islam secured on the government just after the Empire passed the peak of its power. In the virile, zealous period of expansive conquests,

Islam served the Ottoman Sultans well as a spiritual unifying force directing and disciplining their armies in their unquenchable urge to conquer and rule. But the unprogressive theocracy that helped throttle the Empire and contribute to its downfall must not be overlooked. In spite of the natural opposition of the military leaders and the women of the palace, the ulema gained and tenaciously held its prerogatives in practically all fields of government. The ulema was the hierarchy of Moslem teachers and judges who interpreted the Koran and Islamic law. It strangled progress and advancement of every sort and description. Only such things and ideas as existed when the prophet Mohammed lived and were worthy of mention in the Koran could be sanctioned. This repressive force implemented at the very time the renaissance was developing in the West greatly augmented the Empire's doom. Uncompromising as the ulema was in its blocking of advancement, it took no strong measures against the debauchery and dissoluteness of the Ottoman ruling group, in spite of the fact that such conduct was completely contrary to Islamic teachings.

The manner in which the Ottomans ruled their subjects is a matter of great interest and importance. Faithful followers of Islam, they conquered in the name of Allah. Yet they did not require the peoples conquered to embrace Islam. It is probably one of the greatest tributes to their history that the conquering Sultans were tolerant of the religious beliefs of the non-Moslem peoples they subjugated. There was no slaughtering because of unwillingness to be converted, nor were great efforts made to convert Christians. Instead, what was known as the "millet" system of government was employed. Under this system

peoples of the same religious sect were placed under their religious leader and given a considerable degree of autonomy.

The chief requirements of the Ottomans were: recognition of their rule; payment of the required tribute; restraint of rebellion. There were separate millets for the Orthodox Christians, the Gregorians, the Roman Catholics, and the Jews. The Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople (a Greek) was the leader of the Orthodox millet. It covered the Serbs, Greeks, Rumanians, Bulgarians and others who embraced this faith. The Armenian Patriarch directed the Gregorian millet; a representative of the Pope, the Roman Catholic; and the Grand Rabbi, the Jewish millet. Religious toleration and autonomy were marks of Ottoman rule, highly developed when the Empire was at its peak. The Empire was the sanctuary for the Jews persecuted in Spain during the inquisitions in the fifteenth century. A large proportion of the Jewish population in Istanbul (and in fact throughout the Balkans and the Near East) are descendants of these Spanish refugees and most of them still speak Spanish. (Many a modern Turk is convinced that because of the connivance of the Western Christian Powers with Ottoman Christian subjects, religious toleration contributed greatly to the breakdown and final disintegration of the Empire. This attitude helps to explain the moves which the Kamalist regime took to reduce the religious minority problem after it came into power.)

A far more serious disintegrating force that crept into the Ottoman Empire was what were known as the "capitulations," grants to foreign governments. Originally they were merely innocuous courtesies granted foreigners. Suleiman the Magnificent, ruler extraordinary during part

of the sixteenth century, made a friendly gesture to the French to aid them with their trade in Egypt. It was a minor concession, but it was followed by requests and grants to others. The term capitulation does not clearly convey the reason for or the character of these grants. They were an outgrowth of an old legal concept antedating the Ottoman Empire, namely, that sovereignty applied only to one's subjects. The subjects of another power, therefore, residing temporarily within the Empire, were not subject to the laws and courts of the Empire, but rather remained under the jurisdiction of that foreign power. It was the same principle upon which were based the "extraterritorial rights" of foreigners in China.

The capitulation granted by Sultan Suleiman to the French in 1535 became more or less of a model for later ones. England followed the French in 1579, and the other Western Powers at later dates. By the beginning of the nineteenth century all the European countries, except Switzerland, had secured capitulations for their citizens residing and doing business within the Ottoman Empire. Because they held the original grant the French were able to claim the primary right to protect Christians in Ottoman territory. Through capitulations the foreign consuls established their own courts to decide legal matters involving their citizens. Later some governments even operated post offices within the Ottoman Empire.

The system of capitulations operated without difficulty for a considerable time until it was abused by the imperialistic powers. Inordinate demands were made and finally the system of capitulations became the source of exploitation and humiliation of the Ottoman government. Foreigners flaunted their rights—and remained practically tax-free.

The Ottomans were not merchantmen, manufacturers or traders. They looked with disdain upon these tasks, and became totally dependent on their non-Moslem subjects and on foreigners to fill their requirements. All railroad construction, mining, and industrial development were left to the foreigners. Foreign banks dominated the financial life of Constantinople. The economic control of the Empire fell into the hands of the international bankers. With recklessness the late Sultans increased their financial obligations, and the Ottoman Debt Administration became their instrument for collection, commanding all of the rich sources of income of the Empire. The Ottoman Empire was pawned to the foreign moneylenders before the start of the First World War. It was colossal financial victimization of a once powerful government.

The Ottoman panorama would not be complete without a recognition of some of the outstanding contributions made to the world by the Turkish people. Few Westerners are aware that the idea of the Suez Canal was originally conceived by a Turkish Grand Vizier, named Sokulli Mehmed Pasha. He also developed the logical idea of a Russian canal linking the Don River to the Volga so that warships might be moved from the Black to the Caspian Sea. This was in the latter part of the sixteenth century.

Only fifteen years ago, the oldest scientific maps extant of the New World were found in the archives of Istanbul. They were made by a Turkish Admiral, Piri Reis, the first in 1513, and a vastly improved one in 1528. They incorporated the immediately preceding discoveries of Columbus and revealed the thorough knowledge of the Turks in the world of their day. Well might Turkish interest in the New World have sprung from their dreams of world

conquest, for at this time the Ottoman Empire was nearing its crest.

The Turks made many rich architectural contributions to the world. Taj Mahal in India long has been recognized as the work of a master architect, but it is seldom recalled that Ustad Isa, a Turk, designed it. The Turkish architectural genius, Sinan, designed the Mosque of Suleymaniye in Istanbul and the Mosque of Selimiye in Adrianople (Edirne). Both are masterpieces dating from the sixteenth century.

Maulana Jalal-Uddin Rumi (1207-1273), the greatest Turkish poet, was born in Balkh in Khorasan. His father was a noble of such high standing, and of so great a reputation for learning and sanctity, that the King of the Kharezmi Turks gave him his only daughter in marriage. His masterpiece *Mathnavi*, which consists of six books with thirty to forty thousand double rhymed verses, is an immense collection of ethical and moral precepts. Much of it has been translated into English.

Kadi Zadi-i-Rumi (1357-1412) was an important figure among the Ottoman Turkish scholars of his time. Having completed his studies in his native town of Bursa, he made a journey to Khorasan and later to Turkestan. Later he was made President and Professor of the University of Samarkand by the illustrious Turk, Olug Beg. Kadi Zadi co-operated with him in the preparation of the astronomic charts known as "Zig-i-Gurgani." Olug Beg's works are well known in Europe and some of his original manuscripts on geometry and the geometry of Euclid are in the libraries of the Escorial, Paris and Leyden.

Americans in Washington were impressed by the great Turkish diplomat and mathematician, Huseyin Tevfik

Pasha. He served as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in this country back in the 1880's. An astute mathematician, he contributed to the knowledge of linear algebra. There were many others, for the Turks, contrary to popular conception, have made their distinct contributions to the world.

Reform efforts were many in the final century of the decadent old Empire. While they were limited and to a large measure frustrated, the foundation was laid for the radical reforms that were carried out with such brilliance by the Turkish Republic, under their revolutionary hero, Kamal Atatürk. Modern reform efforts date back to the reign of Sultan Abdul Medjid I. He was one of the great exceptions in the long line of incapable Sultans. Midhat Pasha, an intelligent Turkish administrator, introduced a number of local reforms in the Bulgarian and Mesopotamian areas of the Empire. He tried to co-operate with the leaders of various groups in their administration, he reformed the police, established fine coeducational schools, and made significant moves to improve the economic life of the people.

The climax of his efforts cost him his life. He developed the idea of a system of parliamentary government, in which all of the people of the Empire would have equal representation. It was far too advanced and modern for an oppressive reactionary like Sultan Abdul Hamid. With a vicious glee he struck back at the reformers in 1878. Midhat Pasha was killed and many other progressives were killed or imprisoned.

The spirit of reform never died. But it had been so severely crushed that over a quarter of a century was required to organize a sufficiently powerful force to challenge the Sultan's power again. As only the Army had ac-

cess to the advancement of the West, it was inevitable that revolutionary movements centered around army officers. Their organization, known as the Committee of Union and Progress, was led by Enver Pasha. While they succeeded in forcing their way into the government in 1908 and started many reforms, they failed to grasp the fact that their nationalistic concepts could not be combined with the religiously dominated rule of the Sultan-Caliph. They were unable to cope with the economic problems of the Empire, and Enver Pasha was the one most responsible for the Ottoman Empire's entering the First World War on the side of Germany. This war caused the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire though the Sultan did not flee Constantinople until late 1922.

However, what these young reformers, including Kamal, accomplished before and during the war laid the foundation for the Kamalist Revolution and Republic of Turkey that were to follow.

The Ottoman Empire had risen through its internal strength and progressiveness and the internal weakness and backwardness of its opponents. It had decayed and fallen because it became internally corrupt and extremely backward while the West grew strong and progressive.

This is the Ottoman panorama of seven centuries of struggle—from war refugees to war refugees.

CHAPTER TWO

Keys to Conflict

FOUR MAJOR KEYS open the portals to understanding the centuries of conflict that mark the history of the Ottoman Empire. They equally reveal the present situation centering around modern Turkey. These four keys clarify and correlate the otherwise confusing record of these savage struggles.

First key: The greed for territory, trade and power of the successive strong powers of Western Asia and Europe.

Second key: The desire for people with a common heritage, language, interests, customs and religion to be independent.

Third key: The strategic importance of the narrow land and water routes which intersect within Turkey, creating a bottleneck "crossroads of the world."

Fourth key: The tragic misuse of Islam and Christianity to serve as tools in the hands of rulers bent on conquest.

Human greed seems to start with individuals. Greedy individuals unite into strong groups. These groups secure control over larger and larger numbers of human beings. Finally, their might affects the destiny of the human race.

This human greed is repetitious. Powerfully organized units spread their tentacles of control over areas of the

world. Inevitably, they contact each other. These points of contact quickly result in clashing conflicts.

The Osmanli Sultans were the "world champions" of successful warfare for centuries. They spread their power over territory, trade and peoples on three continents. Frequently, their victories were ready-made for them by the weaknesses of those they overran, where incessant conflicts had sapped the strength. Christians had fought savagely with Christians in southeastern Europe, and continued to do so while the power of the Moslems swept over them from the East. Inspired resistance was overcome by trained armies equipped with the latest weapons of war. Indeed, the conquering of Constantinople was finally achieved by the Turks through intelligent use of gunpowder. And it was a Hungarian who produced their effective cannon. On the other hand, the Byzantines and the Europeans were still clinging to older instruments of war.

Decadence followed in the footsteps of the empire builders. Jealousy and corruption crept into the once invincible framework of the Sultan's civil and military power. Retrogression was hastened by the tide of power steadily rising in the imperialistic nationalisms of the West: the Hapsburgs in Austria; the Czars in Russia; the Napoleons in France; the rulers of Victorian England; the Prussians in Germany; and finally, the Savoy in Italy.

The decadent Empire had spread so widely and was holding its distant subjects so insecurely that it was gravely vulnerable to conquest from without. This was a repetition of the greedy conquests of the Sultans, but now there were many rivals aspirants in the field. History provides no moral basis for the conquests of the imperialists, or for those of the Sultans. They were conducted on a similar

plane of harsh war with no more, and no less, consideration for those conquered.

The Austrians were the first to block the forward march of the Turks in Europe. The Hapsburgs made the initial inroads, winning back territory and maintaining temporary independence and security. The Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 began the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, an action which was to continue intermittently for two hundred and twenty-one years until its climax at the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. Most of the Danube Valley, including Hungary and Transylvania, was taken by the Hapsburgs through the Treaty of Carlowitz. This laid the foundation for Austria-Hungary. Poland snatched the Ukraine and Podolia. Russia grabbed Azof.

Three-quarters of a century later Catherine II of Russia warred against the Turks by land and by sea. She sent her fleet all the way around from the Baltic through Gibraltar and across the Mediterranean to block the Dardanelles and seize Constantinople. Complete success was near. The Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774 forced the Turks to surrender the north coasts of the Black Sea and open that sea, the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora to Russian shipping. But Russia failed to secure her coveted goal, Constantinople and the Straits (the water route from the Black Sea to the Aegean). It was Austria on this early occasion who helped prevent the achievement of this objective.

The nineteenth century provided the time and opportunity for Europe's vulture-like nations to claw at the "sick man of Europe" and to tear off rich morsels from the Empire.

The French moved in to take possession of Algeria in

North Africa in 1830. Their excuse was a dispute with the Sultan's representative over wheat supplied by two Jewish merchants in Algiers. They found, however, that forcing the surrender of Algiers and the capitulation of the ruling Bey was one thing. Securing control over the country from a rebellious native population was quite another. It took more than ten years to subdue the natives.

After subduing Algeria, French interests spread eastward to Tunisia. It was natural adjunct to Algeria, but circumstances did not lead to the French seizure of Tunisia by military force until 1881, after they had the acquiescence of the British, in return for their approval of Britain's diplomatic catch of Cyprus.

With seeming impunity the British diplomats balked for years the French efforts to get a concession for the construction of the Suez Canal. As early as 1854, Ferdinand de Lesseps, a Frenchman, formed a company and secured the preliminary concession from Said Pasha, the Sultan's Viceroy in Egypt. Construction of the canal began in 1859. Yet the final concession was not secured from the Sultan until 1866 because of the wily, diplomatic maneuvers of Lord Palmerston for the British Government. He asserted boldly that the building of the canal was a physical impossibility. Even if it were achieved, it would menace British maritime supremacy.

It is significant to note that the canal was completed in 1869. The British, having failed to prevent its construction, purchased nearly half the shares of the corporation in 1875 from the Khedive of Egypt, for slightly less than four million pounds sterling. In 1878 by the Defensive Alliance with the Ottoman Empire the British secured the right to occupy the Island of Cyprus in the eastern Medi-

terranean. A few years later (1882) Egypt was forcibly occupied. A British line of empire was being carefully projected and developed.

Britain's keen desire for the major spoils of the Ottoman Empire in southwestern Asia then became linked with the necessity of protecting its life line. It was Britain's diplomatic policy to support a weak Ottoman Empire and to control its Sultan at Constantinople.

When the Ottoman Empire appeared to be tobogganing the various subject peoples in the Balkans began to revolt, particularly encouraged by the Russians. There were many small feudal groups who had warred incessantly before the Turks came along to subjugate them. In their subsequent struggles for freedom the record reveals no unity in their efforts.

The Serbs were the earliest to gain a measure of independence with a short revolt in 1817. The great bandit liberator of the Serbs, Black George, with the aid of the Russians, won this preliminary, shaky government. It was nearly a half century, however, before the Turkish armies completely evacuated Serbian territory. Here, as in the other Balkan States, there have been bitter internal feuds and civil strife for years.

The Greek struggle for freedom from their Ottoman oppressors was long, bitter, and well-nigh unsuccessful in spite of help from the larger powers. For more than ten years they fought bravely for the liberty the Russians had encouraged them to seek. Even after the Russians had withdrawn their support, because of the Hapsburgs' opposition to the growing Russian influence in the Balkans, the Greeks carried on. They secured the help of the British, particularly against Mehemet Ali, who, at the moment, was aiding the Sultan in suppressing the revolu-

tion. The British defeated the navy of Mehemet Ali. Their General Church took charge of the land fighting. But before the end the British longed to be out of this mess for the Greek bands fought as much among themselves as they did against the Turks. A repetition of this internal bickering and strife has been evident recently in occupied Greece and Yugoslavia.

In the turbulent century of the so-called independence of Greece, non-Greeks have frequently ruled the country. It has never been free from foreign influence. Throughout most of its history it has been more or less a satellite nation of the British, with Germany and Russia competing with them for its control.

The states that were to form Rumania, close to Russia, found the Czars much too interested in their supposed welfare. Russia brought pressure to bear on the Turks and assumed a measure of protective interest over the two divisions, Moldavia and Walachia. As early as 1826, because of this Russian pressure, a greater degree of self-government was granted them under the Sultan. The Rumanians desired neither the "protection" of the Turks nor that of the Russians. In 1856 they combined their two governments under the Rumanian prince, Alexander Couza. Later a Hohenzollern prince became ruler of the country. Yet Rumania joined the Allies against the Central Powers in the First World War and was rewarded with a large section of Transylvania from Hungary and Besarabia from Russia.

The Bulgarians attempted to attain their independence in 1876 but suffered terrifically from the sharp reprisals of the Turks. Russia stepped in again this time, on behalf of the Bulgars, and defeated the Turks. Russia planned to make Bulgaria the major leading nation of the Balkans,

with an outlet to the Aegean Sea. Of course, Russia dreamed of Bulgaria as its springboard in the Balkans. This grandiose Russian plan of domination met with the quick counteraction of the Western Powers in the Congress of Berlin (1878). Once more they spoiled the Russians' broth in the Balkans. Bulgaria was made much smaller, with no outlet on the Aegean. The Western Powers forced her to remain under the Sultan's government. It was not until 1908 that her ruling prince proclaimed himself the Czar of a sovereign Bulgaria.


The mountainous little country of Albania was the last of the Balkan countries to throw off the never too complete control of the Turks. The uprising came in 1912 and shortly it was conceded its freedom by the Turks. The countries of Europe officially recognized Albania as a sovereign state but took immediate steps to see that it was under their aegis by placing Prince William of Wied on the throne in March, 1914. Six months later a rebellion, coincident with the outbreak of the First World War, drove him from his throne. Foreign interference and incursions of forces of Serbs, Greeks, Italians, Austrians, Hungarians and French followed during the war. It was the desire of Greece and Yugoslavia to divide Albania between them after the war, but the country pushed into the League of Nations in 1920. Later King Zog secured control.

Italy did not secure her major territorial gains from the Ottoman Empire until 1911. A military campaign in Tripolitania in North Africa succeeded as a result of a combination of lucky breaks, including the outbreak of the first Balkan War. The Sultan was forced to cede his last North African domain, now commonly known as Libya. By false promises of autonomy to the natives the Italians

also won over from the Turks the Dodecanese Islands, off the shores of Anatolia. The Treaty of Lausanne in October, 1912, secured Italy's pledge to evacuate the islands as soon as the Turks were out of Libya. Later Signor Giolitti, while Premier of Italy, emphatically stated that Italy had no intention of holding these territories. Sir Edward Grey spoke Britain's view on the Dodecanese Islands in 1913 when he stated that their fate "interested all the Great Powers." But in 1915, with the First World War raging, the Allies desired to get Italy to break with the Central Powers and join their side in the war. Concessions had to be given. The secret agreement signed in London in that year secured Italy's entrance into the war and granted Britain's recognition of Italy's full sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands.

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War provided a banquet feast for some of the European vulture-like nations. They gorged themselves. But all did not go quite as planned. Britain and France came out on top with Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, Arabia, and Iraq in their talons. Italy and Greece lost out at the feast to which defeated Germany and Austria-Hungary were not invited. Russia was preoccupied with her Bolshevik revolution. The mighty Ottoman Empire became but a record of history.

It is valuable for perspective to visualize the possessors of various parts of the Ottoman Empire at the dawn of the Second World War. The map on page 40 superimposes the boundaries and countries (before Hitler started into Austria) on the territories once conquered or claimed by the Ottoman Sultans. Areas are conservative approximations for those countries whose present boundaries are in part beyond what may have been claimed by the Ottoman



Map of 1938 Superimposed on the Total Possessions of the Ottoman Empire

Empire. While the present total areas of Algeria, Libya and Arabia are very large, the greater portions are desert. The Empire conquered and ruled the coastal areas but the depth of penetration must be approximated as indicated by the shading of the lines inland.

Soviet Russia had:

Deep northern and eastern coastal areas of Black Sea (north to a line approximately through Kharkov, east to include the Caucasus Mountains and adjacent areas north and south through to the Caspian Sea)	Approximately 250,000 sq. mi.
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France had:

Algeria	80,000 sq. mi.
Tunisia	48,300
Syria and Lebanon*	57,900

Great Britain had:

Cyprus	3,572
Transjordan*	34,740
Palestine*	10,429
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan	Northern section
Aden Colony and Protectorate	112,000

Italy had:

Libya	300,000
Dodecanese Islands	1,035
Northern Eritrea	20,000

* Technically these are mandates. Lord Balfour has defined a mandate as a "self-imposed limitation by the conquerors of the sovereignty which they obtain over conquered nations."

Independent and Semi-independent Nations:

Portions of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland

Hungary	45,230
Roumania	93,856
Yugoslavia	95,576
Albania	10,629
Bulgaria	36,825
Greece (including Crete)	50,147
Western and northwestern Iran	Over 80,000

Semi-independent under British influence:

Iraq	116,600
Western and eastern Coasts of Saudi Arabia	Over 150,000
Yemen	75,000
Muscat and Oman	Over 30,000
Kuwait	1,950
Qatar	Figures unavailable
Trucial Sheiks	" "
Bahrien Islands	250
Egypt	383,000

And finally:

The Republic of Turkey	296,190
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It is noteworthy that of these independent and so-called independent nations, Turkey maintains the greatest degree of sovereignty and independence.

CHAPTER THREE

Double Cross at the Crossroads

"THE CROSSROADS OF THE WORLD" is the third key. This unlocks the major enigma of why the decadent old Ottoman Empire survived so long, and why modern Turkey is so important strategically. The intersection of two of the world's great highways of trade and commerce was within the Ottoman Empire and is now within the boundaries of present-day Turkey. Walled-in Constantinople, renamed Istanbul by the Turks, was the strategic fortress city built at the world crossroads to control and benefit from the through traffic. For centuries it has flourished in proportion to the trade moving by on these highways. Conflict, intrigue and war were the inevitable consequences of the struggle for the possession of the city and its hinterlands.

Military and civil leaders of imperialistic nations have long understood the strategic importance of the crossroads. It has been little understood by the common man of Europe and America. Their eyes have been focused through propaganda on the "terribleness" of the Turk, and the dire necessity of crushing Islam and saving Christianity. Napoleon appreciated this as he dreamed of world empire, although he overstated it when he declared, "the master of Constantinople will rule the world." Nothing

better illustrates the vital significance of these intersection land and water highways than the numerous international agreements and treaties that have been signed relative to them. Merely to list them would require more than the three pages of this book.

What are these two ancient, as well as present-day, world highways? Who are the imperialistic powers that have been clashing and continue to clash over their control and actual possession? The answers to these two questions will dissolve much of the mystery, purposely fostered around "the despicable Turk."

The water route between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean is first in importance. The second is the land route between Asia and Europe, broken only by the intersection of the narrow water route. Turkey has been and remains the buffer, a two-continent nation astride these all-important highways.

The waterway linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean is deep, relatively short and dominated throughout by both continents, though more effectively from a military standpoint by the European shores. This passage way is commonly known as the Straits and will be so referred to hereafter. It is composed of three distinct bodies of water. About sixteen miles long and one to three miles wide, the Bosphorus is the fairly straight link of water flowing from the Black Sea into the Sea of Marmora. The Sea of Marmora is not large, and the direct boat trip from the Bosphorus to the entrance of the Dardanelles diagonally southwestward across this sea approximates 12 miles. Then the narrow passage through the Dardanelle into the island-studded Aegean completes the final 4 miles. The Straits thus total about 181 miles. The contro

of the Straits is the oldest and most persistent cause of conflict in that part of the world, dating from the Trojan War of the thirteenth century B.C.

The land route linking the two continents narrows down to the eastern tip of Thrace in Europe. The Asiatic link of the route extends along the large peninsula that reaches toward Europe between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Commonly called Asia Minor or Anatolia, this peninsula arises from its water boundaries on the north, west, and south to the hilly ridges and high plateaus and valleys. In the south the forbidding Taurus Mountains sweep northeastward with only the Cilician Gates as a satisfactory passage. In the east the mountainous formations are dominated by Mount Ararat, higher than any European mountain peak. During the days of Constantine this land route held the Roman Empire together. But it never again held great importance until the advent of the Prussian dream of a land empire to the east linked by modern railroads.

The Turks required more than a century to conquer the Straits completely. They crossed the Dardanelles as early as 1356 but were unable to take Constantinople until 1453. It was not until 1475 that they completely possessed the shores of the Black Sea. But then the Turks established a monopoly on all shipping on the Black Sea and the Bosphorus. This they held for nearly three centuries before the Russians were strong enough to defeat them. This monopoly was broken with the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774. Long before this Russian victory, the French, followed by other European Powers, had brought more and more pressure on the Turks in order to get distinct advantages in shipping to and from Constantinople,

through the Dardanelles and across the Mediterranean. They were not permitted to go on through the Bosphorus into the Black Sea.

When the Turks had captured the eastern Mediterranean shores and Egypt, all the trade between Asia and the West passed through their hands. The French thought they had gained an advantage over the other Western Powers by making a deal with the Turks to share in carrying this trade. But along came Vasco da Gama in 1499, with the discovery of the sea route to India around South Africa. Spain and Portugal, followed later by Holland and England, soon had the advantage over France by this new route. In the meanwhile the Turks lost their valuable control of the east-west trade almost entirely.

The control of the Straits, however, became a major issue between Western imperialists and the Ottomans. The efforts of Catherine II to seize Constantinople and the Straits have been related. One can see why Russia wanted possession of the Straits. It would be their southern water outlet to the world. Just as obvious is the reason other jealous, Ottoman land-grabbing European nations were willing to do everything in their power to check this Russian expansion to the south. They wanted to circumscribe the Russian bear. This is the basis for the constant struggle over the Straits. It has been marked by double-crossing diplomacy; by secret agreements; by ferocious wars in which various European nations combined at times with and at times without the Turks to block the Russians. Intervening treaties were violated whenever a nation desired to violate them and felt able to do so.

With Austria as an ally, the Russians struck at the Turks in 1789, again with success. But in the subsequent negotiations resulting in the treaties of Sistova and Jassy,

the English, the Dutch and the Prussians acted as the protectors of the Sultan. Russia was kept from taking the Straits.

Napoleon then moved into the limelight of the European stage with his conquests. His ill-fated expedition into Egypt near the end of the century was supposed to open his way to India. Up to this time France had been the most friendly of all the Western Powers to the Sultan. This move temporarily weakened the bond. England and Russia allied themselves with the Turks against France. Rising England seized Malta and threw an Indian army into Egypt to block Napoleon. The Czar's fleet entered the Straits in 1798 and having gained access to these waters as an ally, exploited their use continuously during the next few years—even after the French were out of Egypt.

Napoleon, however, was on the march in Europe again, and Russia and England renewed their joint efforts to stop him. Now Sebastiani, Napoleon's ambassador to the Sultan, won. The Ottoman Empire aligned with France. A British naval force pushed through the Dardanelles and appeared for a moment likely to capture much prized Constantinople. But this threat to the Straits soon passed.

After the Treaty of Tilsit (1807), the French and the Russians schemed the division of the Orient but could not agree who should have Constantinople and the Straits.

Britain strove to win greater influence with the Turks and secured a brilliant diplomatic triumph against Russia by negotiating the Peace of the Dardanelles (1809). This seemingly logical and innocuous treaty achieved Britain's diplomatic goal. It was so worded as to appear that the Ottoman Empire was making the demand, and Britain was conforming to it, when the fact was the British ambassador, Sir Francis Adair, secured precisely what his govern-

ment wanted. The shrewd diplomacy involved is best revealed by Article II of the treaty: "As it has at all times been forbidden for vessels of war to enter the canal of Constantinople, that is, into the Straits of the Dardanelles, and into that of the Black Sea, and as that ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire should be observed, henceforth, in times of peace, with reference to any powers whatsoever, the Court of Britain promises also to conform to this principle."

Just what trick of diplomacy was contained therein may not be obvious on first reading this article: it virtually provided for the exclusion of the warships of all nations from entrance to the Straits. Such an arrangement kept the British warships out, but it also bottled up the Russian Black Sea fleet. More than that, it indirectly bound the British to help the Sultan guard this coveted waterway.

The Ottoman Empire remained aloof from the plans of the European nations developed at the Congress of Vienna (1815). It was obvious that Britain and Austria desired to assume more or less of a protectorate over the Empire. However, the Turks veered away from these would-be protectors and thus inevitably aided the Russian plans.

Russia had started her play in the Balkans early in the nineteenth century by encouraging the Greeks to revolt. The British policy was indecisive. First it frowned on the Russian influence in the Balkans. Then, when Russia withdrew her encouragement of the Greeks, Britain stepped in to help them against the Turks. After they had France and Russia committed, the British hesitated, because of their desire to maintain the Sultan's power. Russia again took the initiative. She moved her armies across

the Balkans for the first time to force the Turks to grant the Greeks their independence (Treaty of Adrianople, 1829). Subsequently, Russia played a leading role in securing the independence of other Balkan peoples. There was the definite ulterior motive of finally controlling these new nations. Her great objective of course was Constantinople and the Straits.

The record moves on with a fantastic twist. It revolves around the threat to the Ottoman Empire from the infamous Mehemet Ali Pasha. He was one of history's innumerable renegade adventurers. Albanian by birth, he had early been a tobacco smuggler. In the Sultan's army he fought against Napoleon's forces in Egypt and after a meteoric rise had become the Sultan's appointed ruler of Egypt. He revolutionized the forces under him after the new pattern of the powerful European nations. Soon he was mighty on land and on sea. He plotted to overthrow the Sultan and usurp the power of the throne himself. He knew the extreme decadence into which the fighting forces of the Empire had degenerated. His drive would be overland, as well as by sea, to take Constantinople.

Wily Sultan Mahmud II, knowing he faced disaster, played one of the cleverest diplomatic moves in history. He called in the Russians to save his throne and empire. Of all nations, Russia, coveting an opportunity to take the Straits and Constantinople, was invited to move in with its army and navy. The Sultan must have been beside himself with fear! How could he invite his most feared enemy to become his protector? History reveals how realistic the Sultan actually was.

There would have been little or no concern in France or Britain had Mehemet Ali usurped the Sultan's throne. The usurper could be dealt with in the same way as any

Sultan on that tottering throne. France was even aiding Mehemet Ali, while Britain appeared indifferent to his ambitions. But to have Russia with its fleet and its army in Constantinople and the Straits was different. The aroused powers would not allow Russia to possess this prize.

The deal (1833) between the Sultan and the Czar was known as the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. Under it Russia literally assumed a protectorate over the Ottoman Empire. There was also the unscrupulous diplomatic device known as the secret clause. According to Russian interpretation this secret provision in the treaty gave the Russian fleet complete freedom of movement through the Straits and barred all warships of other nations, without exception. Now Russia had the maximum advantage of the Straits short of actual possession.

Secret clauses have an uncomfortable way of becoming the knowledge of the diplomats of the countries against which they are created. So this secret clause of Unkiar-Skelessi became disturbing gossip throughout the capitals of Europe. Repercussions came from those who would naturally react to such a deal. The diplomats of France, England and Austria were working quickly to counteract it. It was the master of Austria's international dealings, Metternich, who eased the situation by getting Russia to bind herself with Austria to preserve the Ottoman Empire against others attempting its overthrow.

Things went smoothly for a few years, until 1839, when Mehemet Ali struck again and badly defeated the Sultan's forces. The Ottoman Empire seemed doomed. Russia would take its long awaited prize. France would be entrenched in Egypt and Syria with Mehemet Ali. England was out in the cold. That would not do. Metternich called

for united action of the five greatly concerned powers. The French were angry with the English, and the Russian diplomats went to work with a vengeance to widen the rift. Russia held out against Metternich's concert of action. Secretly Russia advised the Sultan to make peace with Mehemet Ali. Metternich, however, mastered the situation again. His ambassador presented the joint message of the five powers to the Sultan, advising him of their combined interest in the Empire's welfare and of their desire that he should take no precipitate action without their knowledge and agreement.

France, however, was endeavoring to play a lone hand with Mehemet Ali against the Ottoman Sultan in order to secure a distinct advantage in Egypt and Syria. Palmerston started to develop the opposition of Russia, Prussia and Austria to France's schemes. This resulted in the Treaty of London (1840) combining the four powers in their agreement of what the Sultan could offer Mehemet Ali in the way of peace terms. The understanding was that if he did not accept the terms the Sultan could call upon them to force his acceptance. This London Treaty specifically stated that they would defend the Straits and the capital of the Empire against all aggression. More significant was the repudiation of the implications of the secret clause of Unkiar-Skelessi by a definite affirmation of "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire" providing for the closure of the Straits to all warships. Britain had triumphed again.

The struggle continued unabated. Russia could not let such an arrangement stand, even though she had been a party to it. Under the pretext of religion she started war with the Turks in 1853. France and Britain went to the aid of the Ottomans, and the Crimean War continued

the record of the conflict. The principal issue was the Straits, and the treaty attempted to minimize the future threat of the defeated Russians by neutralizing the Black Sea. It was reasoned that Russia without a Black Sea fleet could not wage aggressive sea war. It was a forced, one-sided disarmament.

This humiliating discrimination against Russia led to bitterness and smarting in Moscow. A day of adjustment had to come. It came fifteen years later when Bismarck acceded to Russian demands for a repudiation of the unjust discrimination. Gladstone even admitted to Parliament that Palmerston had doubted at the time that the neutralization of the Black Sea could be made permanent.

The Treaty of London (1871) finally eliminated the discrimination against Russia in the Black Sea. Regulations relative to passage through the Straits reverted to the former pattern, with slightly more power of decision in the hands of the Sultan.

None of these events of history had modified the dream of Russia to gain possession of the Straits, but now it developed that Britain, alone of the European nations, remained determined to prevent Russia from gaining her goal. There had been some interesting diplomatic deals to create this more favorable situation for the Russians. Bismarck was having Germany "lay off" in lieu of Russia's neutrality in the Austro-Prussian, Prussian-Danish and Franco-Prussian wars. Russia had fixed Austria-Hungary with a secret deal. Russia assented to the Austrian plans for the seizure of the Ottoman areas of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Novibazar in return for Austria's assent to Russia's ambitions in the rest of the Balkans.

Therefore, when Russia waged war on the Turks again in 1877, taking advantage of the Sultan's troubles in the

Balkans, it fell to the British to challenge the purposes of the Czar's forces. The diplomatic exchanges between the two countries became heated. Britain received evasive replies with an indication that the Russians might find it necessary to occupy Constantinople temporarily. As the Russians progressed with their fighting, the British became more concerned, and after the fall of Adrianople to the Russians the British fleet was ordered to Constantinople with instructions to force its way through the Dardanelles if necessary. It was stopped at Besika Bay when word of preliminary peace negotiations came from the British Ambassador in Constantinople. They provided that the settlement of the question of the Straits would be put up to the European powers and Russia.

But when the terms of the armistice between Russia and the Ottoman Empire became known, Britain again ordered a naval force to Constantinople presumably to protect British life and property. Russia countered with an order to send troops into Constantinople on the religious pretext of protection of Christians. A compromise a few days later averted the impending clash between British and Russian units.

British diplomats became unusually busy securing concessions from the Russians before the Congress at Berlin started. At the same time, the British signed a special defensive alliance with the Sultan (June 4, 1878) in order to back up Turkey should Russia wage war again.

As before, the European alignment turned against Russian ambitions. Russia's plan to create a large Bulgaria, dominating the Balkans, ran afoul of the watchful eyes of the European nations, and through the Treaty of Berlin (1878) Russia was trimmed badly. Austria secured Bosnia and Herzegovina, Great Britain secured Cyprus and the

way was paved for the French to take Tunisia. The defeated Ottomans lost territory to nations that had not fought against her. Russia was establishing a record of winning wars and losing at peace tables.

The unscrupulous game of diplomatic intrigue, moves, countermoves, and secret agreements continued, but it is impossible within the limits of this chapter to record more of the details. It is sufficient to indicate that the desires of Russia were never achieved though their persistence increased.

The secret agreements entered into by the Allies in the First World War finally seemed certain to bring fulfillment of Russia's dream. These secret agreements developed a chapter in history the American people know little about. They should be vitally interested in them, because these secret deals between the Russians, British, French and Italians were a lurid example of the secret diplomacy that President Wilson castigated in the first of his famous Fourteen Points.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century the groundwork was quietly laid that was destined to revive the importance of the land route. Austria-Hungary had originated the *Drang nach Osten* idea as a negation program blocking the Russians in the Balkans. Now it was taken over by the Prussians as an aggressive plan of empire building along the land route into Asia. It was to be a modern, railroad-linked empire that would spread from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, graphically referred to as the Berlin to Bagdad Railway.

Germany had a providential break to help ease her way into the Sultan's good will. It was the very time British offenses against the Sultan (diplomatically snatching Cyprus and then Egypt) had created distrust and ill will in

Constantinople. Germany's first move was to befriend the Turks with a military mission under Baron von der Goltz. They revitalized the army with the latest of Western methods and equipment. Then in late 1889 the Emperor, Wilhelm II, made a friendly visit to Constantinople to pay his respects to Sultan Abdul Hamid. The Sultan was greatly impressed. This was a rare act of courtesy and friendship by a Western ruler.

The Germans made rapid progress with their penetration during the next ten years. None of the other powers took time to notice or to interfere. German industry, commerce and finance developed along with the plans for the railroads in the Ottoman Empire.

A second visit by the Emperor, just nine years after his first call, clinched the concession of the western Asiatic terminus of the projected German Anatolian Railroads at Haydar Pasha, just over a mile across the Bosphorus from the European eastern terminus in Constantinople. German capital and German engineers pushed the lines of communication that were expected eventually to open up to the Reich the great new raw material resources of south-western Asia. These resources were likewise to be exploited one day by the Germans. The railroad system was not completed when the First World War broke in 1914, but German penetration had proceeded to a remarkable degree.

The British foreign policy relative to the Ottoman Empire took a definite turn about 1903. Up to that time Britain had maintained the policy of preserving a weak Ottoman Empire rather than permitting its dissection and division. She had been definitely committed to the policy of keeping the Straits from falling into the hands of the Czars. But with the dawn of the twentieth century

came also the dawning of the powerful significance of Germany's plans for a strong empire to the east. Britain decided it was wiser to have the Ottoman Empire broken up and Russia in possession of the Straits and Constantinople than to have Germany there with a revitalized Ottoman Empire ready to do its bidding. France conformed with Britain in this change of policy. Of course it was not publicized but Russia, Great Britain and France started secret diplomatic conversations based on this change of policy. Definite understandings were developing when the First World War broke in 1914.

One of the grave errors of history was made by the Sultan and his cabinet under the opportunist Enver Pasha. They made the fatal choice of siding with the Central Powers in the First World War. Even the winning of the war by the Central Powers would have left the Turks the losers.

In the eastern land empire planned by the Prussians the Turks would have become subject people. But in the fall of 1914 that fact was no better understood by Enver Pasha and Sultan Mehmet V than Count Ciano and Mussolini understood their mistake in entering the Second World War on the side of Germany. A few young Turkish officers, like Mustafa Kemal, recognized the error better than the hindsight strategists who in postwar writing proudly pointed out this obvious blunder. Hitler's design of conquest has been just as threatening to the Turks as the Kaiser's was, but there has been this difference—the leaders of modern Turkey lived through the first mistake and are fully aware of this danger.

The First World War, therefore, found France and Britain allied with Russia against Germany, Austria-Hun-

gary and the Ottoman Empire. The important supply route from Britain and France to Russia, namely the Straits, was blocked by the Turks. Russia was in desperate need of supplies and the British wanted to help her. But when Britain proposed forcing the Dardanelles and the Straits in order to move the supplies across the Black Sea to Russia, the Russians first balked at the thought of the British and the French in possession of their coveted goal. This was their ready-made opportunity at last. They exacted secret agreements from the British and the French guaranteeing that Russia would be given absolute possession of the Straits after the war as its portion of the spoils of the Ottoman Empire. The official files covering these secret agreements, published after the war, reveal the reluctance of the British, and particularly the French, to accede to these Russian demands, but the exigencies of the war seemed to allow no alternative. The British and the French were not backward about securing counter grants of Ottoman booty from the Russians. Later, when the Italians came into the war on the side of the Allies and learned from the Russians about this secret division of desired Ottoman possessions, they demanded and received their secret grant of "a pound of flesh" in the form of southwestern Anatolia. This was to the east of the Dodecanese Islands to which Italy also had secured secret recognition of sovereignty. Of course, Italy approved in turn of the secret split of the others.

All these deals were made early in the war. None could foresee that Russia would be out of the war before victory would be achieved, and that a revolutionary government would be in power which would repudiate the old dream of the Czars for sole possession of the Straits and Constanti-

nople. There was secret rejoicing in London, Paris, and Rome that their commitments to Russia relative to the Straits, made under the duress of war, did not have to be fulfilled. Later chapters will reveal the continuing struggle and the increasing importance of the Straits and Istanbul, from the First World War to the present time. The Straits remain of paramount importance.

CHAPTER FOUR

Crescent vs. Cross

Jihad—Holy War of Islam

Crusade—Holy War of Christianity

THE BLOODY RECORD of wars is a tragic one, but infinitely more tragic is the bloody record of so-called holy wars. Islam and Christianity have been debased through history, and their perversion to serve human greed has desecrated the spirit of God and man. This is the fourth key that reveals to our confused and biased minds the truth about the centuries of conflict centering around the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire.

A warning must be given. Beware of this ground. A post-mortem examination of human baseness may be condemned as a ghoulish operation, but it is unavoidable if we are to understand the truth.

In the past these two religions have been used as diabolical tools of war. Today they stand more aloof from the attempts to secure their sanctification of the bloody world-wide conflict. Tomorrow may they fulfill their mission of elevating men to that nobler spiritual plane where they will war no more.

The Koran (Holy Book of Islam) unfortunately provided a basis for the use of Islam as a justification for

war. These are the passages: “. . . Kill the idolaters* wherever you may find them; and take them and besiege them, and lie in wait for them in every place of observation; but if they repent and are steadfast in prayer and give alms, let them go their way.” Koran IX, 6. “Fight those who believe not in God and in the last day, and who forbid not what God and his apostle have forbidden, and who do not practice the religion of truth from amongst those to whom the Book has been brought, until they pay the tribute by their bonds and be as little ones.” Koran IX, 29. “Excite the faithful to war.” Koran IV. Yet it is a striking fact of Islamic history that the leaders of Islam have never made the forceful conversion of the nonbeliever one of the fundamental pillars of the faith.

There were two and only two reasons for the existence of an army under Islam. First was the Jihad or Holy War against the unbeliever. Second was the suppression of rebellion. Islam developed specific regulations to govern the Jihad. Unbelievers must first be invited to embrace Islam. If they follow a sacred book and are not idol worshipers they are to be given one of three choices:

Become faithful followers—or

Submit to the rule of Islam and enter into a treaty accepting the Moslem conqueror as their protector and pay tribute to him—or

Fight.

If they accept Islam, they are secure and become an integral part of the community of Moslems. If they merely submit to Moslem rule, they pay a poll tax which assures them of their personal safety but gives them a definitely lower status in the community. If they persist in fight-

* Jews and Christians have never been included by Islamic leaders under the term idolaters.

ing, the door of repentance is held open to them even when the armies are face to face. But the defeated fighters' lives are held forfeit, their families may be enslaved and all of their possessions may be seized and confiscated. Moslem apostates must be put to death. Four-fifths of the booty goes to the conquering army.

Jihad is the Arabic word used as the title for the Holy War of Islam. It never appeared in the Koran but was employed later. Caliph is the Arabic word for successor. It was the title reserved for the descendants of the tribe of Mohammed who were in turn his successors. Only the Caliph was supposed to be able to call a Jihad or Holy War.

The Caliphate had lost its importance almost completely after the conquest of Bagdad by the Seljuk Turks in the eleventh century. Many persons assumed the title of Caliph at the same time, all, of course, claiming to be descendants of the Prophet. An Arab went to Egypt and claimed he was one of the Abbasid Caliphs. His name was Muteveklil Alellah (the one who is submitted to Allah). Though he occupied a palace in Cairo he was not known or honored in the whole Islamic world, as one might presume. He was little known and wielded no political power.

Sultan Selim the Grim in the first part of the sixteenth century conquered most of the Arabian peninsula and Egypt. In Cairo he forced this unknown Caliph, Muteveklil Alellah, to abdicate his title of Caliph to him. Thus Sultan Selim the Grim was the first Sultan to assume the added title of Caliph.* This was in 1517 when the Ottoman

* The contention of Turkish and other historians that Selim the Grim was the first Sultan to assume the title of Caliph is disputed by others who contend that the Ottoman Sultans from Murad I (1362) assumed the title. Dispute over this point of history does not alter the basic facts of this chapter.

Empire was already near its peak. Selim the Grim was not disturbed over the fact he was not a descendant of the Prophet's tribe. He would still be Caliph and as Caliph he would conquer and lead all of the Islamic world. This was the first great dream of Pan-Islam, but not as most Western nations have understood its conception. By assuming and revitalizing the title of Caliph he planned to conquer and rule all of the Islamic—as well as Christian—world. Indeed, he more than doubled the size of the Ottoman Empire by conquering Moslem peoples and making them subjects, but he never succeeded nor did any later Sultan-Caliph ever succeed in securing the obeisance of the entire Islamic world. Even Selim's son, Suleiman the Magnificent, held the title of Caliph as of little value, and most Sultan-Caliphs to the time of Abdul Hamid II made no attempt to exploit it against the imperialist powers of Christendom.

Though the Janissaries and the Sultans fought and won wars as fanatical Moslem zealots, they never carried out the forceful conversion of conquered Christians. They demonstrated very clearly that conquest and power were their goals—not the saving of the unbeliever through Islam. Under the title Sultan-Caliph, the successive Sultans subjugated Moslems and non-Moslems, treating them all as lowly subjects, inflicting oppressive taxes and other levies. But restriction of their religious practices or beliefs was not an actual part of the Ottoman method of government.

The Crusades were the Christian counterpart of the Jihad. The Seljuk Turks had captured the Holy Land. The Saracens had desecrated the holy places and interfered with the pilgrimages of the Christians. This inflamed all Christian Europe. The spiritual force of these peoples was

released in the Crusades for the reconquest of the Holy Land from the desecrators. Under the banner of the cross, the Christians were marshaled to go forth to war against the crescent, inspired by the deepest and loftiest emotions of man.

The greed of man quickly came in to pervert these powerful movements of the spirit. The knights of the cross became the pawns of the selfish interests of their day. The Crusades were turned to the material advantage of the city-states of North Italy. They profited immensely by these spiritual crusades which diverted the trade from the East into the harbors of Genoa, Venice and Pisa. Venice gained above all others. She secured important trading advantages from the Byzantine rulers. Her leaders always dreamed of more trade and how to overcome their competition.

Along came the leaders of the fourth Crusade (thirteenth century) without money or ships but earnestly seeking both to carry out their mission of freeing the Holy Land. The Venetians drove a hard bargain with them. They would furnish the ships but only if the expedition first sailed across the Adriatic to conquer and subdue the rival Christian city of Zara. The Crusaders accommodated. Christian Zara was seized and turned over to the Venetians.

Now a still greater opportunity for commercial gain came to the Venetians. A fierce internal struggle was going on within the Byzantine palace of Constantinople for the power over that great city and all Byzantium. Alexius appealed to the Crusaders to aid him in his fight against his usurping uncle. He offered special trading concessions to the Venetians. The sop to the spiritual purposes of the Crusaders came in the fantastic prospect of uniting the

Eastern Orthodox Church under the Western Catholic Church. Pay to the Crusaders was assured. The deal was made. The soldiers of the cross, committed to fighting the Saracens and restoring the Holy Land to the Christians, now moved their forces instead to subdue another Christian city, this time Constantinople.

Not in nine centuries had impregnable Constantinople been conquered. But the defenders were weak and corrupt when the Crusaders struck. They conquered and in turn desecrated. Never had the world witnessed such plundering of a city. Art and monuments were destroyed. Booty was divided between the Venetians and the Crusaders. Citizens of the city were slaughtered indiscriminately.

The Crusaders set up a new government. The Orthodox Church was turned over to the Roman Catholics. Venice garnered most of the commerce. The dreams of the Doge had been fulfilled. The majestic capital of the Byzantines was so shorn and weakened that it fell to the Osmanli Turks two centuries later. Christianity had been betrayed and degraded by the wantonness of the Western leaders. They set an example that was to be repeated, with variations, for many centuries. Whereas the Crusades had been projected as Holy Wars to conquer and restore the Holy Land, their perversion and the schismatic struggles within Christianity actually helped pave the way for the onward march of the crescent to the West.

Through the capitulations which France secured from Sultan Mahmud I in 1740 the French obtained certain rights for Roman Catholics in the Holy Places. The French, because this was the first successful diplomatic effort on behalf of Christian interests by a Western power, assumed and later claimed steadfastly they were the protectors of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Actually

their "protection" was dormant for a considerable time due in great part to the French Revolution.

Meanwhile the development of Russian interests in the Orthodox Church in the Holy Land gradually resulted in encroachments on the Roman Catholic Church. The quarrels between the monks of these two branches of the Christian faith might have been settled quietly but for the ulterior motives of Napoleon III. He seized upon them as an opportunity to win over the French clericals to his support and also to humiliate the Russian Czar. His ambassador in Constantinople handed the Sultan's Grand Vizier France's formal demand for the restoration of the Roman Catholic rights which had been impinged by the Orthodox group.

The Grand Vizier proposed a mixed commission of inquiry. France conditionally agreed. She required that no documents later than 1740 be permitted as evidence. This condition barred the Russian claims based on the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji. Naturally the Russians balked. This diplomatic scrap was developing just the pretext they wanted for waging war for their coveted goal in Ottoman possession, namely the Straits. Such a threat by Russia under the guise of religion did not fool the British. They had no choice but to stand back of the Sultan.

The Sultan then issued a firman which granted the rights of "protectors of Christians" to both France and Russia. Napoleon wanted war for dynastic reasons. The Russians thought it a propitious moment to drive the Turks out of Europe and seize the Straits. Thus imperialist France and imperialist Russia were more than ready to misuse Christianity with the pretense of defending Christians in the Ottoman Empire.

Prince Menshikov demanded a satisfactory settlement

of the issues involving the Holy Places and recognition of Russia as "the protector of Christians" in the Ottoman Empire. Both demands had been met with a remarkable degree of reasonableness. But the Czar started the war he clearly wanted in order to win the Straits and dominance in the Balkans. He professed not to be waging war but merely securing material guarantees for the enforcement of existing treaties. Finally the Sultan declared war on Russia in October, 1854, and France and England joined the Ottomans in the bloody war that was fought in the Crimea until Russia yielded. In the subsequent Treaty of Paris the Russian concession of abandoning their claims to the "protection of Christians" was the least important decision. The real objective, checking the Russian drive for the Straits, was accomplished.

Later the tyrannical ruler of the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Abdul Hamid II, felt his throne might be pulled out from under him by the jealous powers of the West. Only their jealousy was keeping him tottering insecurely, and he sought an additional means of checking their threats. There was one possibility. He must resurrect the power in his title of Caliph. Unity must be restored to the Islamic world to counteract the aggression and inroads being made by the Christian West. By the time of his reign (1876-1909) considerable segments of the Islamic world had become subjects of the Christians as represented by Russia, France and Great Britain. Pan-Islam was to be his salvation. He, the Caliph, would invoke the Jihad and lead the Holy War to throw off the yoke of the Christians.

He scattered his emissaries into all parts of the world to incite the keepers of the faith to their spiritual obligations. He made a grandiose plan to build a railroad to the holy places of Islam. Thousands of pious pilgrims

would be aided in their sacred pilgrimages and would recognize their benefactor. A stamp tax was levied in the Empire to pay for the railroad, and of course the contributions of other Islamic countries would be welcome to help the project. It failed as miserably as did the whole Pan-Islamic movement of the despotic Sultan. But Pan-Islam struck fear into the hearts of the people of Western nations. It served imperialists well to hold organized Christianity in line with its devious plans of conquest.

In 1914 Sultan Mehmet V sealed the doom of the Ottoman throne and Empire, though he was not to live to see it occur. He cast his lot with the Kaiser in the First World War, shortly after its outbreak. The Prussians had educated themselves about the Islamic world and had envisaged the invoking of a Jihad by the Sultan. It was their plan to weld the fanatical followers of the great prophet Mohammed into a destructive force that would disrupt the hold of their enemies over these subject peoples. Their dream of land empire to the East would be attained in large measure through the use of Jihad.

Carefully the groundwork was prepared. The Sultan communicated with the Sheikh-ul-Islam, his highest religious authority, to secure his endorsement of a Jihad. The answer was a clear-cut confirmation: "It is the duty of all Moslems to assume arms against . . . the foes of the Ottoman Empire and of the Sultan-Caliph. It is their duty to revolt and mutiny."

Jihad was proclaimed by the Sultan-Caliph on November 11, 1914, in the city of Constantinople. It was a proper religious ceremony. The faithful everywhere were called upon to rise and fight. Not once in the lengthy proclamation was there a mention of Christians or Christianity. It was directed against the Western Allied Powers because

they were oppressing Islam and persecuting its followers. Two hundred million Moslems were subject peoples of the three Allies—Russia, Great Britain and France. Imagine what might have happened to the Allied cause had these fanatical Moslems obeyed the Jihad.

But the myth of Pan-Islam was exploded completely. There was no general uprising of Islam against the enemies of the Sultan. Instead the British stealthily snapped the ties of the Sultan-Caliph with his subject Arabs. They inspired these followers of Allah, the kinsmen of the Prophet, Mohammed, to revolt. On July 14, 1915, the British conveyed to the Grand Sharif of Mecca, Husain, this promise: "Great Britain recognizes the independence of the Arab countries, and agrees to the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate for all Islam." Grain and gold reinforced the temptation. British manipulation was highly successful. The heroic British figure of Lawrence leading the revolt of the Arabs is one of the proud chapters of British World War history. However, their promises to the Arabs have given them many a diplomatic headache since.

The Arab revolt against the Ottoman forces and the failure of other Islamic peoples to respond to the Jihad revealed the deep cleavages that existed in the Islamic world, as they existed in the Christian world. Moslems killed Moslems and Christians killed Christians in that cataclysmic First World War. Moslems betrayed Moslems as Christians betrayed Christians. Moslems joined Christians to kill Christians and Moslems. Yet, to a remarkable degree, the imperialist powers (Germany included) propagandized their citizenry and controlled their organized branches of the Christian religion—Orthodox, Gregorian, Catholic, Coptic and Protestant—to support the war as a Holy War.

To the awesome chapter of that First World War must now be added a further perversion of religion. It leaves one coldly disillusioned and depressed. Organized Christianity has done little of what it might have done to remove the red blotch of Armenian blood that besmirches its record.

The Armenians lived principally in that area of the world immediately south of the Caucasus Mountains, dominated by Mount Ararat, extending south and westward over eastern Asia Minor. Apparently because of the remoteness of their cities and villages in the mountains they were successful in defending themselves for centuries, and they remained a distinct group in spite of the innumerable conquerors that passed over their homeland.

The Armenians are reputed to have been the first people, as a group, to embrace Christianity. Never a large population, they maintained their unity as a Christian brotherhood in spite of the evidence of mixed racial heritage. Their principal church forms a distinct branch of Christianity known as Gregorian. Thousands died in martyrdom in the early centuries at the hands of Christians of the West because of their steadfastness to certain unique traits of their belief. There are also small groups of Catholic and Protestant Christians among the Armenians.

The Armenians were bankers, manufacturers and tradesmen throughout the Ottoman Empire. The manufacture of silk, powder and other products was theirs. They became known in the far corners of the world as clever, sharp traders—probably too good for their own ultimate welfare. Human beings have a way of becoming envious of continued success achieved by any one group.

While there are only estimates of Armenian population, their number within the Empire was probably be-

tween one and two million. From two to four hundred thousand were living in Constantinople at the outbreak of the First World War. These Armenians were never a political, religious or military issue until about three-quarters of a century ago. For previous centuries they lived under the rule of Ottoman Sultans in remarkable freedom and security, under their own millet, led by their own Gregorian patriarch. Their Christian faith had been no cause for friction with their Moslem rulers. They held high posts in the government and in places of trust due to their talent. They had not been singled out by the French or by the Russians as a group of Christians requiring their "special protection." The Armenian Christianity bore a slightly different label.

But in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as the British and Russians played their diplomatic game of cross and double cross, the Armenian Christians were "discovered" as a potential tool. The Russians had taken a section of the land between the Caspian and Black Seas inhabited chiefly by Armenians. This furnished a basis for operations. The Czar's representatives were charged with sowing dissension in the realms of the Sultan.

Then the British decided to become interested in the Armenians. They professed also to find it necessary to "protect" their fellow Christians. The Russians took the lead in requiring the Ottoman government to give guarantees for the security of the Armenians. The British followed suit. This official solicitude on the part of the Russians and British for the Armenians with the Ottoman government created the "Armenian Problem." Having created the "Armenian Problem" in the minds of the Turks, the repercussions started to show their effects on the distraught Armenians. They were in turn bewildered,

perplexed, vexed and finally made supersensitive about their position. They were driven into a sullen isolation from their former friendly rulers. They started to seek furtively for the aid of Christians of foreign lands. They trusted the promises of the Western nations. Thus, tragically, the Christian nations' meddling in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire created in the warped mind of Sultan Abdul Hamid II a distrust and hatred of the Armenians.

Impetuously the Armenians organized a revolutionary society known as Hunchak to prove to the Christian world that they would fight for their liberty. But Abdul Hamid moved first, and the start of the Armenian massacres occurred early in 1895 when some three hundred were killed. The British, French and Russians voiced the outrage felt throughout the Christian world, and exacted promises of greater autonomy for the Armenians. This was not difficult for the devil on his throne. He could promise and he could continue his slaughter. Both he did. The Kurds were secretly incited against their Armenian neighbors with the privilege of looting as they killed. Soon nearly 80,000 Gregorians were dead. The careful planning was evident by the fact that none of the Armenian Catholics were molested.

Then a few misguided Armenians in the capital made a ridiculous move. They rushed in one morning and took forcible possession of the Ottoman Bank in Constantinople, crudely thinking they could force the Sultan to yield to their demands by holding the financial heart of the Empire. Their stupidity was pitiful. But the "champions of Christians" from without clamored for their release. The Sultan, with satanic, unrevealed glee, granted the plotters free exit to go to Paris. Then he set the Kurds

loose in the capital and before forty-eight hours passed they accounted for six thousand Armenian lives and collected their reward. The great "protectors of Christians" who had forced guarantees in peace treaties were now totally incapable of acting concertedly or firmly. They protested and denounced and let it go at that.

But the ruler of another great Christian country, imperialistically minded, capitalized on the situation in a most contemptible manner. While Britain, France and Russia were manifesting their disgust and displeasure through their diplomats, the Emperor Wilhelm II of Germany traveled to Constantinople to pay his official and personal respects to the murderous Sultan. His tribute to the devil brought him his reward in the form of the concession for the Anatolian railroads to further his *Drang nach Osten*.

The First World War broke on a weak and corrupt Ottoman Empire. German ober-officers were everywhere with the Turkish forces. By the spring of 1915 the Russians were pouring their troops through the Caucasus to launch their offensive against the eastern Ottoman front where lived many of the Armenians. The usual war propaganda was pushed over on these unfortunate people by the Russians. They were encouraged to betray their brutal rulers and help in their liberation by their Christian Russian brothers. Weapons of war were provided. Indeed to many Armenians it seemed their only hope. Armenian resistance became a real menace to the Turkish defense. German officers and civilians scattered throughout the Armenian districts. They instigated with Prussian thoroughness the wholesale deportations of the Armenians from near the front. The Armenian massacres, historians agree, were not an impetuous act of fanatical Moslems

bent on exterminating Christians. They were the result of the cold-blooded political policy of a weak Ottoman government influenced by the Prussians. It was the Prussians' secret conviction that this was the logical time to eliminate a talented people whose functions in the Empire they intended to take over entirely after military victory had been achieved. This combination of cruel circumstances led to some of the worst crimes committed in the First World War. The Armenians were nearly exterminated.

When the war ended in an Allied victory less than fifty thousand Armenians were left alive in Asia Minor. Forlorn Armenian refugees who had escaped were scattered over the face of the earth. The hope for a free country of Armenia still persisted in their hearts and was given encouragement by the Allies.

The United States under Wilson wanted no spoils out of the war and thus was a serious problem to its imperialistic Allies. Wilson might frustrate some of the pre-arranged division of spoils, particularly the planned dissection of the Ottoman Empire. The Tiger, Georges Clemenceau, unholy grabber for France, bespoke his concern quite frankly to his colleagues but not for publication: "The horrible thing is the Americans do not want anything. How can you deal with such people?" There seemed to be a way. The Christians of America had been stirred deeply by the Armenian massacres. They were pouring out their money through the Near East Relief to alleviate the suffering in this battle-scarred area. Why not have this high-minded, philanthropic country take a protective mandate over the new Armenia to be created? This would balance off the British and French mandates contemplated for other territories to be taken from the Otto-

man Empire. Moreover American-mandated Armenia would form one of the strong cordon of buffer nations to encompass Soviet Russia.

The proposal was broached. It struck a warm response. Soon all the country was being told how noble and truly Christian it would be. The Church people and the leading citizenry of the United States were thoroughly convinced of its merit and feasibility. But President Wilson had dispatched a commission to investigate and report. Their report revealed the dangerous implications of the proposal and it was summarily refused by Wilson.

But the British and the French were not ready to drop the plan for an Armenian buffer nation. Armenian leaders were brought to the peace conferences leading to the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). By this treaty they were granted a sufficiently large segment of the Ottoman Empire to have nearly a square mile for each Armenian then remaining alive in Asia Minor. The area assigned to be their nation was inhabited chiefly by Moslem Kurds but it was arranged that all of them would be forced to move out. Not a solitary Moslem citizen was to be permitted in this new treaty-created Armenian Nation. This was victorious Christian planning! All the Armenians who wished would be repatriated from the corners of the earth where they had taken refuge.

So the remaining, bedraggled Armenians were misled and betrayed once more by their supposed "Christian Protector Nations." They set up their government and tried to take possession of the area granted them by the treaty. It was in the hands of the Kurds and the Turks. They too had lived there for centuries and they were the great majority of the population. The Armenians had no adequate means of establishing their treaty rights and their "pro-

tectors" were already in conflict over division of the Ottoman spoils to the south. Armenia never became a nation, except on paper and in the minds of these unfortunate people.

The foregoing record of the perversion of Islam and Christianity is a tragic one in all its aspects. With Islam the Ottoman Turks conquered and despoiled. With Christianity the Western Imperialist Powers conquered and despoiled. In both cases the spiritual lives of countless millions were desecrated in the name of their religion. It remains a black page in history.

CHAPTER FIVE

Dissection—Insurrection—Resurrection

The Place—Sèvres, France.


The Scene—The Dissection of an Empire.

The Time—The morning of August 10th, 1920.

The ranking surgeons of Europe's medical profession did not stand ready to perform this operation. There were no white robes, no trays of surgical instruments, no concern for the dying victim. This was a belated, postwar dissection of a vanquished empire now in its death throes. Morning coats, top hats, spats and gloves were the correct attire. A parchment, pen, and ink were the instruments of operation.

Here had gathered the ranking diplomats of the great sovereign nations of Europe. The Hon. George Dixon Grahame, K.C.V.O., represented Great Britain. Monsieur Alexander Millerand was the delegate of France. Le Comte Lelio Bonin Longare would sign for Italy. M. Eleftherios K. Venezelos was there to sign for Greece. General Haddi Pasha, Riza Tewfik Bey and Rechad Haliss Bey had the ignominious duty of signing the document of dissection on behalf of the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire.

It seems incredible that such a performance could be



Map of the Ottoman Empire Dissected in Accordance with the Treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920

heralded to the world of 1920 in the name of peace and justice. Ironically enough, if the spirits of the war dead were unseen witnesses, they saw the dissectors carving up the once most feared master of the profession, now grown too old and dissolute to protect himself.

Millions of disillusioned Americans had joined in another part of that selfsame "war to end all war" and "to make the world safe for democracy." But they were not watching or caring any longer. They had turned their backs on Europe in disgust, and were blinding their world vision with the renewed glare of isolationism. In spite of wide publicity in such papers as the *New York Times*, the dissection aroused little curiosity and no resentment in well-propagandized America. But the ink was scarcely dry on the paper before this treaty became a powerful weapon in the hands of Kamal (the Turkish revolutionary hero) to call out the hardy folk of Anatolia to fight against this feast of the European vultures.

The dissection requires careful examination with the map by those who would understand what has happened in the interim and what may happen today and tomorrow.

* Western Thrace, Smyrna (Izmir) and its environs were sliced off the Ottoman Empire and tossed into the lap of the waiting Greeks.

* The Straits were artfully dissected from the whole and passed into the hands of an international commission to administer as an open waterway.

* Arabia, Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia were the coveted segments tossed to Britain and France. Arabia, of course, was to be technically independent.

* Nearly one-quarter of Asia Minor—the southwestern segment—was served to Italy.

* A slightly smaller segment of Asia Minor—central

southern—was carved out for France to link up with its Syrian segment.

- * An autonomous Kurdistan was carved out of the southeastern provinces.

- * A large portion of the east and northeast was carved off to be made a free and independent state, called Armenia.

The dissectionists still fancied they could keep the Sultan on his throne in Constantinople as a puppet to do their will, though he had been stripped of all territory but that small remaining segment of northern Anatolia.

They were stripping his Empire of control of its internal organs as well.

- * They provided for the removal of all of its armaments.

- * They sliced deep into its internal structure and securely bound up the resources and finances of the Empire in order to have them available for carrying the Ottoman Debt, to care for the settlement of the war indemnities, and to cover the expenses of the armies of occupation.

- * They resuscitated those dormant leeches, the capitulations, and provided them with their gluttonous living from the bleeding part of the remaining section of the torso that was the Sultan's.

- * They did not neglect their fifth column operators in the blood stream. The minorities were guaranteed equal civil and political rights, regardless of treasonable actions, and a proportionate share of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

The treaty's very viciousness was its undoing. In the eyes of Turkish patriots, like Kamal, a more dastardly treatment of a helpless victim could scarcely be devised. Their reaction was immediate and explosive. All the Sultan's staff had feared the final settlement would be severe.

None conceived that such complete dissection would be attempted. It was so extreme that it served Kamal perfectly. With it he aroused the people of Anatolia to rise and fight again. Unless they fought and died now, Turkish independence would be lost forever!

But over a year before the dissection Treaty of Sèvres an event of momentous importance had set the stage for Kamal and his close cohorts. This was the Greek invasion of Anatolia through the port of Smyrna (now called Izmir). The Greek forces made their landing in Smyrna May 14, 1919, just a few days before Kamal sailed from Constantinople for Samsun on a new assignment under the Sultan. The Greek army had landed at Smyrna under the pretense of having been assigned the task of policing the area. It soon became evident it was an invading army, sent with the secret connivance of the British and French to block the Italians. Neither of the great powers wanted to allow the Italians to possess that section of Anatolia promised in the secret agreements made during the war. The Greeks would be perfect stooges, and under Venizelos they fell in line with the diplomatic skulduggery of Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Great Britain. And remember! This was during critical 1919 while Woodrow Wilson was trying to get the United States Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and join the League of Nations. Allies in the war were busy at the game of double-crossing one another before the dissection of the Ottoman Empire had actually taken place.

The reaction in Anatolia and Constantinople was severe following the serious excesses committed by the Greeks. The Allies found themselves forced to appoint an Inter-allied Commission to investigate and report. The Commission was headed by Admiral Mark Bristol, American

High Commissioner to the Ottoman Empire. Associated with him on the Commission were one British, one French and one Italian general. They were to learn the truth and make an unbiased report. When the report was made it was most adverse to the Greeks. It stated very bluntly that the Greek occupation appeared to be an invasion, rather than a policing force; that it was contrary to the principle of nationalities, because the Turks were more numerous throughout the area with the exception of Aivalik; that the Turks would undoubtedly resist the forcible annexation of this territory by Greece; that a Greek expedition unsupported by the Allies would not be successful; and finally, that the Greeks should be replaced immediately by Allied troops.

This report was political dynamite and had to be suppressed. It was. Venezelos worked on Lloyd George and Lloyd George handled the U. S. State Department. Our Admiral Bristol's report was kept from the American public. It was never published officially by any country, but it did appear in the *Paris Eclair*, in October, 1919, and later was republished in some Turkish newspapers. There it was capitalized on by the men bent on trying to save what they could of Turkey. The Sultan's government in Constantinople now made an unforgivable move. It turned over to the British a number of revolutionary-minded Turks. The British immediately deported them to Malta. And the tension mounted.

Kamal had been sent into Anatolia as Inspector General for the Third Army. He carried with him the news of the Greek invasion. Immediately he took complete advantage of his power in the interior to organize resistance against the anticipated partition of his country. As early as July (1919) he made his preliminary moves to block the Allies.

He convoked the Congress of Erzurum which sat for two weeks under his chairmanship. These men reached decisions that were historical, but dangerous to themselves. They risked arrest, imprisonment and possible death for their patriotism.

They loyally decided to resist the partition of the Empire and defend it against further occupation and intervention. They called for a provincial government that would undertake to defend the country in case the Sultan's regime was unable or unwilling to do so. They were emphatic in their expressions of determination that no special privileges or concessions were to be given to the Christians, Armenians or Greeks within their territory. They were equally as emphatic against being placed under a mandate or protectorate of a foreign power.

A similar Congress was convened at Sivas in September (1919), again under the leadership of Kamal. The actions of this bold General were taken by the Sultan and his Cabinet, under Damid Ferid Pasha, to be more dangerous than the demands of the Allies. Kamal was ordered back to Constantinople. When he refused to obey the Sultan's order, a subsequent order was issued for his arrest. His commission was canceled. On the same day he resigned not only his commission, but all connection with the Army, in order that he might act as a private citizen. Actually, he was leading a full-fledged insurrection. It was not long, therefore, before the Cabinet decided that he had committed treason. The death sentence was passed. This death decree was signed by the Sultan a short time later and strenuous efforts were made to arrest or kill Kamal.

Kamal's followers hoped that a way could be found to resist the inroads of the foreign powers and preserve the government of the Sultan at Constantinople. They were

not yet prepared for the radical plans in the minds of Kamal and a few of his closest friends. Indecision, divided opinion, cowardice, complete exhaustion from the war, deprivation, and anarchy were the stark realities facing this man who had proved himself on the battlefield, but who had yet to prove his skill as a statesman.

The Greek army moving in from Smyrna, the Italian forces moving up from Antaylia, the French forces in the south-central district, the Armenian resistance supported by some Russians in the east, and finally the dissection Treaty of Sèvres aided and abetted Kamal in rallying the people. The outlook was hopeless. Yet, the indomitable spirit of this man so overcame all obstacles that minor successes began to be achieved.

First came victories over the Armenians in the east, which ended that conflict favorably for the Turks in 1920. The Treaty of Gumru was signed on December 3rd, 1920.

The Soviet government in Moscow was the first to recognize and enter into diplomatic relationship with this desperate, revolutionary group. Within two weeks of the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres the Soviets entered an accord with Kamal's representatives. This early act of friendship, the first decided demonstration of good will toward the revolutionary Turks, has not been forgotten. Recognition by the Soviets, in 1920, was to be followed by a more substantial treaty signed in Moscow on the first anniversary of the military occupation of Constantinople by the Allied forces, March 16, 1921. In this treaty, the Soviets specifically repudiated the Treaty of Sèvres and officially confirmed the boundary set by the Gumru Treaty, which remains, with slight modifications, the boundary between Soviet Russia and Turkey. They renounced the old treaties of Czarist Russia and they indicated they had

no desire to gain control over Constantinople or the Straits. They accepted the cancellation of the capitulations. Each government agreed to block the formation of any organizations within its boundaries that might operate to the detriment of the other. They also agreed to undertake future consultations for the advancement and regulation of the economic and financial interests of the two countries.

Great weight must be given to these early understandings between these two revolutionary governments at a time when it was uncertain whether either could succeed. Sincere friendship developed under such strain possessed qualities of endurance. This is evidenced by what has taken place in the past two decades.

Defections between the Allies began to appear early in 1921. The Turks were quick to take advantage of them since their own situation was growing precarious. The French government sent M. Franklin Bouillon to Ankara to confer with Kamal early in June, 1921. It was the first move on the part of any one of the Western Powers to try to reach an understanding with this group in Ankara. When the Turks finally checked the Greek advances in the fall of that year, the French decided to recognize this new nationalist government. This has generally been interpreted as a backhanded effort on the part of the French to embarrass the British because of the British unwillingness to support the French policy against the Germans at that time. Not only did the French withdraw their troops from Adana and the surrounding region, but they deliberately abandoned hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of valuable war equipment for the use of the Turkish armies against the Greeks, who were backed by the British.

The Italians had become highly incensed over the British support of the Greek invasion of Anatolia. The Italians

realized they were being deliberately double-crossed by this maneuver, which prevented them from securing that area of Anatolia which had been granted to them in the secret treaties signed by Britain, Russia and France during the First World War and reinforced by the Treaty of Sèvres. For that reason, the Italians also withdrew their troops in the summer of 1921, leaving the Turks free to concentrate on stopping the Greeks.

In spite of these breaks, the Turks were at a great disadvantage. They were badly outnumbered by the Greeks. Kamal's army was inadequately equipped. The real assets of the Turks were the outstanding generalship of Kamal and Inonu and the undying spirit of a people fighting for their homeland. Late 1921 was the darkest hour in the struggle for survival on the part of the revolutionary Turks as they made their final defense and held the line along the Sakarya River.

The following year, 1922, marked the resurrection of Turkey out of the ruins of the once all-powerful Ottoman Empire. In this year the Turks were able to recover sufficient strength to attack and rout the Greek armies. In September they entered the city of Smyrna. Their victory was complete over the retreating Greek army which had laid waste the entire area, sacking and burning villages, and massacring the helpless Turkish inhabitants. Vicious vengeance was the tragic final chapter of this warfare. It was blared to the American public, who had been given no adequate background for understanding the situation.

Little time was lost in celebrating this victory. The Turks were determined to press their claims against the other Allied Powers who were occupying their great city at the Straits. As soon as Kamal moved north toward Gallipoli, the French and the Italians withdrew their troops.

If a clash were to occur, they wanted it to be between the British and the Turks. Not one of the nations was willing to challenge the determined Turks' plan of repossessing the city of Constantinople. The British General Harrington, with other Allied officers, crossed the Sea of Marmora to Mudanya to conclude an armistice. This armistice, October 11, 1922, ended the conflict. The Greeks were required to move back to the Maritza line, while the Turks moved across the Straits to Europe, reclaiming their great city of Constantinople.

On November 1, 1922, the Grand National Assembly, meeting in Ankara, abolished the Sultanate, but granted the Sultan permission to remain as Caliph. The Sultan, however, fearful of what his fate might be once the nationalist Turks were in complete control, took refuge (November 17) on the British warship *Malaya* and was taken to Malta. The next day, the Assembly chose the Crown Prince Abdul Medjid to be Caliph. Three days later, the Conference at Lausanne was convened to undertake the negotiations for a peace treaty between the Allied Powers and Kamal's Turkey.

Between the armistice of Mudros in 1918 and the armistice of Mudanya in 1922, the Turks had turned from defeat to victory. The Ottoman Empire had been crushed and its territories divided, but a new nation had been born, a nation destined to make its way in a hostile world. The success of the Kamalist Turks sped the fall of the Lloyd George government in Great Britain.

CHAPTER SIX

Peace by Piece

NO TIME COULD be more appropriate for studying Turkey's masterpiece of "Winning the Peace." It began twenty years ago and has steadily mounted piece by piece. How did Turkey win the peace? And keep it? Here is a success story worth retelling in a war-weary world.

Turkey was the worst defeated power in the First World War. The old Ottoman Empire had been bled to death. The "sick man of Europe" had been executed in expiation of his crimes according to the Western interpretation. The postwar dissection was witnessed in Sèvres, France, nearly two years later. All the limbs had been removed and the head had been left dangling in Constantinople, separated from the small remaining segment of the body. But a miracle took place in the barren hills of Anatolia. The heart of Turkey was preserved in the small segment of the body left in those rugged hills. Most brilliantly, Kamal had gathered strength for this spirit and resurrected Turkey as a national entity. This reincarnation was scorned as illegitimate by the "holier than thou" family of nations of Europe—though their own closets were full of skeletons.

The spokesman for this new national child, claiming his rightful heritage, was a native-born Asiatic with the name

of Ismet (Ismet Inonu). He was a provincial Oriental most assuredly. He had not traveled beyond the old Empire before, and now he was to go to Lausanne to plead the case of the national foundling before the favored sons of the Great European Powers: Lord Curzon for Great Britain; Monsieur Barrère for France; Marquis Garroni for Italy; Tchitcherin for Russia. Ismet was small and slight and somewhat deaf. None of the favored sons really knew him when the mighty peace table was set at Lausanne, Switzerland that November morning in 1922. He approached to take the inferior place assigned to him near the end of the table while an atmosphere of derision filled the room. Even the chair awaiting him was of an inferior quality. He quietly asked why there was this difference. Anger at his insolence rose within those seated, but was diplomatically suppressed for the moment, while an excuse was manufactured. The explanation was soon forthcoming that, in the haste of arrangements, sufficient comfortable chairs were not obtainable. Ismet politely bowed and said he would withdraw and wait until another was procured. One of the more comfortable chairs was quickly found, and the first outward manifestation of assumed superiority was removed. But the spirit and attitude persistently pervaded the opening speeches. Barrère of France pointed to the unity of the Big Brothers with hands across the table, willing to take the time to consider the pleas of the little upstart who asked modification of the sparse fare served up by them at Sèvres over two years before, which had been eaten without great objection by the late Sultan. Lord Curzon, in an hour's carefully prepared discourse, offered the same scant diet.

But Ismet demanded an entirely new menu, providing for a full course dinner from soup to nuts, served by the

same waiters and on the same dishes as served the Big Brothers. He was not the spokesman for a defeated Ottoman Empire and a runaway Sultan. He was the representative of a newborn Republic with a great President. This Republic had won its place of equality among the nations by its victorious armies. Evidence was the armistice signed by the generals of the Great Powers, at Mudanya. Ismet's demands raised so serious an issue that the actual decisions had to be postponed for months, while the favored sons scattered to their homes for consultation as to what was to be done with this recalcitrant youngster.

Ismet of the new Turkey was proving more than a match for the representatives of the Great Powers who were figuratively kicking each other's shins under the table, while professing to be holding hands above the table. Each could be played against the other in securing Turkey's requests. Ismet used this key to achieve success for his efforts when the Peace Conference was resumed in early 1923. The cross interests and selfish ends sought by each power served to secure Turkish objectives one by one, piece by piece. Turkey's claims were not exorbitant. They were based logically on the existing situation secured by military victory. No nation was in a mood to fight again with Turkey. Certainly none would fight for the other's interests. So Ismet could be patient and wait out his adversaries on each issue.

The issues were few but relatively important. They might be summarized as follows:

1. Repudiation of the Treaty of Sèvres.
2. Recognition of the Turkish Nationalist Government.
3. Settlement of Boundaries of Turkey.

4. Status of the Straits.
5. Greek Reparations.
6. Minorities in Turkey.
7. Capitulations.
8. The Ottoman Debt.

The first issues were already being favorably settled by the very existence of the conference at Lausanne to solve these problems.

There was only one major difficulty encountered in establishing the boundaries of the new Turkey. The Turks greatly simplified the problem by making no claims to the vast areas of the old Ottoman Empire which had been lost in the First World War. They conceded the loss of Arabia, Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia. One small area was in dispute—the vilayet of Mosul which Great Britain claimed on behalf of Iraq. Since they were unable to agree on this point the Conference consigned the issue of Mosul to the League of Nations for a decision. Otherwise, Turkey's boundaries were established in accord with her claims.

The real bone of contention, as might be expected, was the status of the Straits. The British were insistent upon Wilson's "twelfth point" relative to the demilitarization of the Straits and its free use for all shipping. Here Tchitcherin of Russia fought the case for the Turks against the British. He insisted that the Turks must have sovereign and unrestricted rights over the Straits for their own security. Had Ismet wished, he might have won this point, but, apparently, he and his government wanted neither to strain their relationships with Britain, nor throw themselves too much into the hands of the Russians. Ismet was pursuing an independent, national policy for his government insofar as possible. He accepted the thesis of the

British and agreed to the demilitarization of the Straits, and the establishment of an international commission to control shipping through these waters.

Greece had recognized her obligation to pay indemnities for the destruction wrought by her campaign in Anatolia. Magnanimously, the poor, struggling Ankara government waived all claims to reparations or other payments because of the strained financial situation of the Greek government.

Instead of indemnity, the Turkish leaders emphasized "Turkey for the Turks" and insisted on an exchange of populations. The plan called for the transfer of Greeks from Turkey and Turks from Greece. The Turks were convinced that this exchange would eliminate the greatest potential cause of friction between the two countries. With slight modifications, which excluded the Greeks established in Constantinople before 1918, and the Turks in western Thrace, the plan was accepted.

Turkey won completely on the issue of the abolishment of capitulations. All privileges granted to foreigners by the Sultans in consideration of loans and the development of business enterprises were canceled. Foreign courts were abolished. All legal matters hereafter would be dealt with in Turkish courts. The Ottoman Debt, the real ruler of the old Empire, was reduced. The new Turkish government assumed control and pared down the old debts. The Ottoman Bank had held the exclusive right to issue the Ottoman currency, although it was still controlled principally by the French capitalists.

Italy was left in possession of the Dodecanese Islands. This was unsatisfactory to the Turks. Its implications during the next two decades will be noted in connection with Italo-Turkish relationships.

When the Treaty of Lausanne was finally signed on

July 24th, 1923, it was recognized as a great diplomatic victory for modern Turkey.

Turkey had now achieved international recognition and respect in a measure no one, not even the most optimistic in Ankara, could have hoped for. The resurgence in Turkey received tremendous impetus from this diplomatic triumph, and Kamal and his followers were capable of making the most of their gains.

Because there were serious issues still to be settled with Great Britain and France, Turkey strengthened its ties with Russia in 1925, by signing with the Soviets a ten-year Pact of Neutrality and Friendship. This pact was renewed in 1935.

It must be kept in mind constantly, however, in appraising Turco-Russian relations, that there was no quarter given to communism or communistic propaganda in Turkey. Ataturk was bent on his own national revolution and had no time or interest for the world revolutionary ideas of the Third International. The Communist Party was specifically banned in Turkey, and the movement has never made the slightest progress there. Russo-Turkish friendship was further strengthened by Russia being the first to help in the industrialization of Turkey. The Soviets furnished technicians and advice on Turkey's five-, and later, three-year plans.

Tension mounted in 1925 over the boundary dispute between Iraq (backed by the British) and Turkey regarding the vilayet of Mosul. Each country was determined that Mosul be included within its borders. Turkey claimed it on ethnic grounds and requested a plebiscite, the most logical and just solution of the problem. Britain demanded that the dispute be arbitrated by the League of Nations, although Turkey was not a member of the League at the

time. The British interests centered around their valuable oil concessions in this region. (There were American interests in this oil of Mosul also.) Turkish troops clashed with natives and people in the area. Many were killed. Some were massacred. Others were forcibly removed, according to reports reaching the outside world.

In 1926 the League decision, adverse to Turkey, was made. It was absolutely refused by the Ankara government. Turkey was adamant and war threatened. British diplomacy went to work with all its skill. Finally an agreement was reached between the British and the Turks. Iraq was given Mosul but the Turkish government was to receive ten per cent of the oil produced in the vilayet. Turkey, not yet a member of the League, had refused its unfair decision and had won out. The strained relations created by this controversy delayed Turco-British co-operation for years. But it did settle this issue and helped Kamal to proceed with the gradual building up of his international peace front.

Turkey, from the Treaty of Lausanne on through the late twenties, was increasingly concerned over the eastern threats of Mussolini and his Fascists. The Turks now could concentrate on diverting Mussolini's empire building program from the Levant to Africa. Their hand had been strengthened by their settlement of the Mosul issue, for the British also were averse to Italian disruption of the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean.

At the same time, the Italians seemed anxious to exploit the Turks' distrust of the French. These were the factors forming the background for the Pact of Friendship signed by Italy and Turkey in 1930. It did not mean that the Turks would forget their claim to the Dodecanese Islands, or that they had lost their distrust of the Italians.

The ambitions of Il Duce were a sinister threat to the Turks. Five years later, Turkey's League vote was for sanctions against Italy, and the Turks offered the British the use of their waters for their fleet in the sharp issue drawn over Abyssinia. Italy, in turn, was the only nation that refused to sign the Montreaux Convention in 1936, granting the Turks the right to fortify the Straits. These events developed the generally unsatisfactory feeling that lingered between Turkey and Italy.

Turkish leaders in Ankara, who had been imbued with the necessity of cultivating friendly relations with all countries, began to feel that membership in the League of Nations and subscription to the principle of collective security should be an integral part of their foreign policy. In 1932, in line with its rising prestige and envisioned plan for future security, Turkey applied for and was admitted to full membership. Its foreign policy, as evidenced by its voting in the League decisions and its actions in all international relationships, was to acquire the strongest possible collective security for its independence and sovereignty. It supported the status quo, and opposed all aggression. Turkey's peace front was mounting piece by piece against the possible encroachments of predatory powers planning conquest.

Ataturk knew well the dangers in the Balkans, with their deep-seated prejudices against one another. He deliberately chose to champion peace and unity in place of distrust and conflict. This was indeed a new procedure for a military conqueror, but his actions matched his sincere intentions. Other Balkan countries also were aware that their greater danger was from without, rather than from one of their small Balkan neighbors. Kamalist Turkey's brilliant diplomacy in its promotion of peace, sincerely and earnestly,

greatly forwarded the Balkan Pact, finally signed in 1934. As early as 1929, conferences of representatives of the Balkan countries were held at the behest of Turkey. While nothing came of the first meetings, because of Bulgaria's dissatisfaction with her frontiers (lacking an outlet on the Aegean and desiring the return of the Dobrudja), they set the stage for the Balkan Pact which was signed by Turkey, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece a year after Hitler came into power. Albania was not a signatory. She was dominated by Il Duce, who felt that the pact was directed against Italy as much as it was against Germany. Bulgaria held out for the reason mentioned before.

This Balkan Pact brought into existence an actual Balkan Entente based on a Council of the four Foreign Ministers and on an Economic Council. The four countries mutually guaranteed each other's borders against a Balkan aggressor. They agreed not to enter into negotiations with one another or with any other Balkan country without informing the others. They agreed to consult on all matters of common interest. This was a frank effort to establish open diplomacy in place of secret diplomacy.

Linked with this collaboration in the Balkans were the steadily improving ties between Turkey and Greece. The exchange of populations involved over twelve hundred thousand Greeks from Turkey and nearly four hundred thousand Turks from Macedonia. It was accomplished with the aid of the League of Nations and the Near East Relief. This exchange was a great misfortune and hardship for the peoples involved. Nevertheless it accomplished the Turkish objective. It minimized the minority problem which had been such a friction point.

A Pact of Friendship between these long-standing enemies was signed on October 30, 1930. On September 14,

1933, a still more significant instrument was signed in Ankara, Article 1 of which reads as follows: "Greece and Turkey mutually guarantee the inviolability of their common frontiers." This was no mere scrap of paper. It was a sincere expression of a grim determination of two neighboring nationals to try to bury their past unfortunate relationships and work together as friendly neighbors.

The disturbing events of Europe were raising questions in the minds of the Turkish leaders about their inability to defend the Straits, now demilitarized. Mussolini had defied the League, and the sanctions applied to Italy. Hitler had staged his Rhineland coup and was rearming Germany in defiance of treaty obligations. The Japs were well along on their road to Asiatic domination in defiance of the rest of the world. Turkey could have done likewise, and probably no one would have attempted to stop her. But the Turks respected their word and won the immediate admiration and the sympathetic ears of the nations struggling to uphold the League of Nations. They chose to use legal processes for the adjudication of their claims. Their request, dated April 10, 1936, was addressed to the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

Russia was more than ready to agree that Turkey, a friendly neighbor, should fully arm and control the Straits. Great Britain, likewise, was eager to strengthen her friendship with Turkey and have the country better able to defend these vital waterways against the dangers that might be ahead. France, now an ally of Soviet Russia, no longer feared Russia's influence in Turkey. A favorable decision might have been reached more quickly but for the British fears of the Russians. They desired to modify Turkey's original proposals in order to limit the benefits that might accrue to Russia by the changed status.

The Convention of Montreaux, signed on July 20, 1936, was a compromise between the British and Turkish proposals. Turkey was granted the right to fortify the Straits. The ratification was for a limited duration of twenty years. The principle of Turkish security was recognized, however, without time limit. It was ratified by all, except Italy, who was still smarting under sanctions.

Turkey and Russia were the chief beneficiaries of this convention. Turkey, by fortifying the Straits, would be in a far stronger position to defend herself. Russia gained control of the Black Sea, because of her fleet in these waters. Russia was now permitted to send warships into the Aegean without limitation, providing they passed singly. She was expected to give Turkey eight days' notice of such intended movement. In the past, Great Britain had always opposed this unilateral free movement by Russia. All other powers were limited to a combined tonnage of 30,000 in the Black Sea at any one time, and not more than two-thirds of that could belong to a single power. They were required to give Turkey fifteen days' notice of such intended movement, and they were limited to a stay of only twenty-one days in the Black Sea.

It was another definite, diplomatic victory for the Turks. While their control was not absolute, it made Turkey far more powerful in all future negotiations. Turkey was sought more than ever as an ally by the Great Powers. Its friendship and goodwill magnified in importance after Montreaux.

Up to this time modern Turkey had had little success in trying to get foreign credits to help with its industrial and other developments. In 1933 Russia had given an initial credit of approximately ten million dollars to aid the five-year plan. But now, as Turkey assumed greater

potential asset value in the political arena, where partners were being secured for the next war which was brewing, the imperialist powers stepped out with substantial foreign credits to the Ankara government. In 1938, Great Britain granted a loan for armaments of six million pounds sterling, the armaments to be purchased from Britain. The British gave a trade credit of ten million pounds sterling to be used to increase Turkey's heavy industry. Germany and Russia did some competitive lending. Germany came forth with one hundred and fifty million reichsmarks. Russia produced an eight million dollars' credit. Turkey, the seeker of sovereign security, was being wooed by three powerful nations.

Turkey was just as energetic in forging her peace program to the southeast as in the Balkans. The Middle Eastern countries were approached and, after consultations, the Saadabad Pact was signed in 1937 by Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey. They mutually guaranteed each other's borders and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

Piece by piece, Turkey had welded a strong chain of pacts of friendship with all of its neighboring nations and its potential enemies, before Kamal's untimely death in late 1938 robbed the new, vibrant nation of its spectacular leader.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Streamlining a Nation

THE NATIONALIST TURKS had a vision of their new nation far beyond the grasp of the unimaginative foreigners in Istanbul, who boastfully contended they knew the incapacities of the Turks. Few individuals steeped in Western prejudice are willing to concede unindustrialized countries a chance to advance to a relatively favorable place in the family of nations.

Modern Turkey rose out of the debris of the old Ottoman Empire with a rapidity that staggered even mass-production, speed-minded Americans. The edifice being built was a singularly new and streamlined nation. It was incredible. This achievement is the political miracle of our day. Kamal and his loyal followers built far better than the cynics believed they could.

Like all great architects attempting to erect a strong and durable structure, they excavated the quicksands and decadent muck of the old Empire and laid their foundation on solid rock. In the years of the losing struggle to save the Sultan's Empire from the conflagration that was to destroy it, they became bitterly conscious of the things that must be discarded and eliminated before a new state structure could be started.

The power of Islam had to be absolutely expurgated from government. The construction of a national edifice could not be undertaken until this vision was clear and unequivocally accepted. Kamal, alone, saw this from the beginning. He proclaimed with all his vehemence that the new government must finally rest with the people, and be in the interest of the people. This was fundamental. Its achievement is to the everlasting credit of this man of great vision and brilliant tenacity. Without this complete secularization under the constitution, and the Grand National Assembly, modern Turkey of 1944 could not have been built.

The Sultan had been most accommodating after the abolition of the Sultanate by ignominiously fleeing from Constantinople on a British warship shortly after the Armistice of Mudanya. But it was the heroic struggle eliminating the Caliphate and abolishing the Seriat (the Islamic law) as the law of the State that placed the foundation of Turkey on secular rock. This was the miraculous achievement of Kamal. A combination of fortuitous circumstances and sheer will power account for his success. The Caliphate was abolished by act of the Grand National Assembly in early 1924. Western codes of law were adopted in place of the Islamic law. They were the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Penal Code and the German Commercial Code, with slight modifications.

Linked with the excavations and removal of old obstacles were the reduction of religious minorities and the elimination of the capitulations.

The religious minorities problem had been partially liquidated under the old regime by the Armenian massacres and by the fleeing of large numbers of Christians from the country. It has been estimated that over a million

Christians fled from Turkey. The problem was further reduced by the exchange of populations between the Turks and the Greeks in the twenties. Accurate statistics are not available on the present religious minorities in Turkey. The best estimates are that there remain about 110,000 Greeks, 80,000 Jews and about 60,000 Armenians. The total constitutes a small percentage of the present population of the country.

An additional and possible final chapter may now be developing relative to these minorities in Turkey. This involves the capital levy known as the Varlik Vergesi. This law was enacted December 17, 1942. The foreign press has insisted that this capital tax has been administered in such an inequitable manner as to confiscate the wealth of these minorities and force many of them out of business. Turkish officials deny this categorically and vehemently. If the charges are true the Turks may reduce to a minimum their delicate religious minorities problem while the rest of the world is primarily concerned with war.

The determination to forego all claim to those old areas of the Empire peopled by non-Turks was the shrewdest kind of streamlining, devised by farsighted, coldly calculating planners. The Turks perceived that their nation could not be integrated with large sections of disloyal, foreign-minded citizenry. Yet there were many critics who early contended the Turks would soon forsake their pledge and undertake to reconquer at least a part of their lost territory. Time has discredited their disparaging charges.

The Kamalist group cleared the ground for a very solid foundation by their unswerving hold on their strongly stated principle, "Turkey for the Turks." They have been sure that on this foundation of a united people they would build the strongest nation.

The Nationalist Turks must be credited with making another master stroke from a national economic point of view. They insisted on the complete abolition of the capitulations and secured the removal of this foreign yoke through the Treaty of Lausanne. This was the advance economic streamlining operation so essential to the construction of an unfettered, independent, national economy.

The old Ottoman Empire was heavily mortgaged in 1914 at the outbreak of the First World War under what was known as the Ottoman Debt Administration. The banking system, including the Ottoman Bank, was for the most part owned and controlled by foreigners. Only the Agricultural Bank was Turkish. Germany, with her development of the Berlin to Bagdad Railway, had financed and engineered the building of most of the railroads. The utilities, port and harbor facilities, and limited mining ventures had been developed with foreign capital, supremely secure under the capitulations.

The old Ottoman debts were reduced theoretically in proportion to the losses of territory and population and then assumed by the Ankara government. Actually Turkey was forced to take a disproportionately large share of this debt (62% of a large portion of the debts, as well as 75% of another portion were taken). The total debt assumed was one hundred seven million Turkish pounds. Even though extremely burdensome, the debt has been carried by the Republic without default in payment. A renegotiation of the debt was made in 1933, greatly reducing it. The extraordinary achievements of handling and reducing this obligation with the bondholders must be credited to the untiring efforts of Sukru Saracoglou. He was Minister of Finance until Kamal's death. He then became Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister.

The new, inexperienced government purchased and took over the operation of most of the railroads operating within the boundaries of modern Turkey. "Turkey for the Turks" has proved to be sound nationalist policy even though it has slowed the program of industrialization and trade advancement. The assumption of control of the monetary system and the unfaltering avoidance of burdensome foreign loans during the early days were earnest efforts to prevent new complications with international bankers.

Before these preliminary tasks could be completed the Turks moved relentlessly into the well-nigh insuperable task of erecting the pillars of state. The Grand National Assembly, which was, in theory at least, representative of the people, established the Republic of Turkey. Kamal was elected the First President of the Republic on October 29, 1923. Twenty years have passed since that election. It is simple to sit and write about the intervening momentous events—the struggle to create a new nation that could withstand all the vicissitudes of a changing, avaricious, unfriendly world. But during those first years when the author was observing this new Turkey in the making, there was uncertainty, tension, hope. An enthusiastic, persistent, fighting spirit permeated the air in defiance of the defeatists in the former capital.

The Turkish constitution adopted by the Grand National Assembly on April 20, 1924, was a model of modernity. This basic instrument of the new Turkey incorporated many of the finer concepts of European and American republics. Article 1 of the constitution is the brief statement: "The Turkish State is a Republic." That article alone of all the constitution is not subject to alteration or amendment under any circumstances.

The constitution vests the legislative and executive power in the Grand National Assembly which "is composed of members elected by the nation in conformity with the electoral law." The Grand National Assembly elects the President.

While all students of modern Turkey are aware of the fact that the Turks have not achieved their democratic goals, it is recognized that they are making steady progress in this direction. The people have been assured, first by Kamal and later by Inonu, that they will attain their full constitutional rights as rapidly as they are trained and prepared to assume them. These democratic goals are as real and vital to present day Anatolians as they were to the colonists of the United States following the adoption of their constitution.

The final step in the rapid, complete emancipation of governmental Turkey from the yoke of Islam is well illustrated by the changes made in the second article of the constitution since 1924. The second article originally read as follows: "The religion of the Turkish State is Islam; the official language is Turkish; the seat of government is Ankara." It has been amended twice.

The first amendment, April 10th, 1928, changed the article to read: "The official language of the Turkish State is Turkish; its seat is the city of Ankara." By this amendment eliminating the first part of the article the constitution was freed from fettering the state with an official religion that might be used to try to usurp governmental authority. It was a tremendous liberalizing move but not as some people of the West might construe it. No one should be misled into believing that this paved the way for the substitution of Christianity for Islam. Nothing was more remote from the plans of the members of the Grand Na-

tional Assembly. It was a carefully thought out move calculated finally and completely to divorce the religion of Islam from the government.

(It may be well to interpolate here that the odium of Christianity held by the Turks is the inevitable result of the historical record of their dealings with peoples and nations calling themselves Christian. Until a better exemplification of true Christianity is long demonstrated both inside and outside Turkey, there is small likelihood that Christianity will encompass many Turks.)

Along with the above amendment came other amendments wherever necessary throughout the constitution to provide for the change of oath from "I swear before Allah" to "I swear on my honor."

The second amendment to this second article was made on February 5th, 1937, causing the article to read now as follows: "The Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, laique, and revolutionist. The official language of the State is Turkish, its capital is the city of Ankara." Here is the Turkish government's own effort to put into words in the constitution its concept of the State. It is worth while to attempt an explanation of each of the six descriptive adjectives used. Such a study may serve to reveal how unique Turkey is. It is distinctly different from Communist Russia, Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany.

The Western concept of a republic is definitely embraced in the Turkish form of government with a constitution, a Grand National Assembly elected by the people, a President elected by the Assembly, and a Cabinet. The distinctive feature of this government, as it has functioned to date, is the existence of only one party, the People's Party. Whether democracy in the American sense,

with two or more parties, actually free elections, and a greater degree of freedom of the press, speech and radio, will come in time remains to be seen.

Most Americans also have a common understanding of nationalism akin to the Turkish point of view. But ultra-nationalism has marked the record of modern Turkey to date. This has been but a defensive outgrowth of the lessons learned from the First World War. The Turks' suspicion, fear and distrust of everything and everyone within their borders not enthusiastically one hundred per cent Turkish can only be softened by time and successful internal integration and development.

The Turks' interpretation of populism is that their government is indigenous even though it has many characteristics of older governments in other parts of the world. This new Turkish government is "of, by and for the people," as expressed for us by Abraham Lincoln. This is basic democracy and is being taught throughout the country. Individuals may rise from the lowliest start to the highest offices by merit alone. This is happening regularly in Turkey today as it did in the old Ottoman Empire.

The etatist principle is in danger of being associated with the practices of the totalitarian nations. The government found it necessary to take the active leadership in the industrialization of the nation. There were not the private capital and private initiative to execute this essential program with sufficient rapidity to maintain economic independence and the progress demanded to support the military, educational, social and cultural programs projected. It is worth noting that this principle was not officially adopted until 1935, two years after the start of the first five-year plan of industrialization. After ten years of searching struggle, it had become abundantly evident etatism was

the only way to achieve their industrial goals. They would not throw away their economic independence again by inviting foreign capitalists to take over. The Turks still believe they can preserve private capital and initiative alongside their large state socialism program. Time alone will give the final answer.

The lay or *laique* basis of government is fundamental to all Kamalist Turks. They did not liquidate or abolish their religion of Islam. There is no tabu on religion in Turkey. The Turks are far from being atheistic, though they have been quite materialistic. There have been no anti-God or anti-Allah museums, no anti-religious propaganda drives, no persecution. Hate propaganda against their neighbors or minorities does not exist in any of their schoolbooks. Inonu is respected as a faithful Moslem. He has restored Moslem chaplains to the armed forces. But the Kamalists did succeed in completely secularizing their government. They fully intend to keep it secular.

Revolutionist, Kamal's government surely was. It had to fight to overthrow the authority of the Sultan as well as to defeat foreign armies on its soil before it was recognized. But the Turkish word, *devrimcilik*, means reformist as well. The Kamalists not only revolted and overthrew the old authority, they organized a government that was committed to change customs and institutions and even the conduct and personal interests of the people by national law. There was no time to wait for these changes to evolve slowly out of the will and desires of the people. Progress must be highly motivated by those in authority—particularly, during his life, by Kamal, himself. The unbelievably rapid achievement of the goals desired was ample demonstration of this principle at work in the new government.

The leaders of modern Turkey have well defined their government with these descriptive adjectives. All of these characteristics appear natural, essential and youthfully vigorous in the life of this new nation.

The following quotations from the constitution verify its exceptional qualities.

“. . . Every Turk is born free and free he lives. Liberty consists in the right to live and enjoy life without offense or injury to others. The only limitations on liberty—which is one of the natural rights of all—are those imposed in the interest of the rights and liberties of others. Such limitations on personal liberty shall be defined only in strict accordance with the law. . . . All Turks are equal before the law and are obliged to respect the law. . . . All privileges of whatever description claimed by groups, classes, families and individuals are abolished and forbidden. . . . Inviolability of person; freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech, of press; freedom of travel and of contract; freedom of labor; freedom of private property, of assembly, of associations; freedom of incorporation, are among the natural rights of Turks. . . . The life, the property, the honor, and the home of each are inviolable. . . . No one shall be arrested or deprived of his goods and chattels except by due process of law. . . . Torture, corporal punishment, confiscation and extortion are prohibited. . . . No one shall be molested on account of his religion, his ritual, or his philosophic convictions. . . . All religious observances shall be free on condition they do not disturb the public peace, or shock public decency or exist in violation of social conventions or the law. . . . Legislative elections take place every four years. . . . Each deputy represents not only the constituency which has elected him, but the whole nation. . . . Amend-

ments to this Constitution may be made only upon the following conditions:

"The proposal to amend must be signed by at least one-third the total number of deputies.

"The proposed amendment must be thereafter discussed by the Assembly and adopted by vote of two-thirds of the total number of deputies.

"No proposal to alter or amend Article 1 of this Constitution, specifying that the form of the government is a Republic, shall be entertained."

The entire constitution is being taught to the children throughout the country in the public schools. Democracy is being inculcated in the rising generation of Turkey.

There was basic agreement on the social objectives of the Turks. This occurred because of the relatively small differences that existed among most of the Turkish people in education and social life. The Turks were able to achieve a greater degree of personal freedom quickly due to this fact. Class distinctions were undeveloped. The citizen of poor birth was able to, and did, rise to high public office by merit alone. Turkish leaders have come from all parts of the country, even from families of partial foreign extraction and divergent skin pigmentation, without discrimination. The all-important thought in the minds of the followers of Ataturk was that they were Turks and had a noble heritage. All believed in the justice of their cause and the certainty of great advantages to come from their changing life. It was this fortunate background that made possible the tremendous social changes. The old traditions, superstitions, slothful practices and undesirable excrescences that had become attached to the static religion of Islam through the centuries had to be completely obliterated before modern concepts could be inculcated.

A few men were actually put to death because they opposed the religio-social reform discarding the fez. The edict compelling the change from Moslem fez to Christian hat or cap was put into effect throughout the country in twenty-four hours on the second anniversary of the Republic, October 29, 1925. Typical of the skillful manner in which the shrewd Kamal took full advantage of the deep loyalty of his hero-worshipping Anatolians to persuade them to accept his radical changes was his oft-repeated speech in different villages in the interior relative to the fez. He would say with commanding eloquence: "The old regime made the wearing of the fez a test of your loyalty. I am making the wearing of a hat a test of your loyalty to me. You will wear a hat (in deference to me)."

Islam had taught the deeply ingrained, fatalistic philosophy of Kismet. This concept has been aptly, though not too accurately, expressed "What is, must be." Through Kismet people resigned themselves with a sense of pious patience to the existing circumstances of life as inevitable. Kismet was also the basis of their fatalistic belief that death came at the appointed hour and could not be altered by one's own efforts. Such a pernicious belief had to be purged from the minds of the Anatolians to make way for the Western activating ideas of self-improvement and advancement.

The way to accomplish these goals was education. It became the mark of a weak Turk to be satisfied with his lot. Each must try to improve, to rise above his past. Kamal was fully aware of the terrific task before him in remolding the daily practices and thoughts of his people. Education, which had been the privilege of the few, now became the necessity of the great majority. The government undertook

the development of a national educational system that would reach into all the small villages.

Linked with the development of an educational system came a startling move to purify the language from the foreign words, particularly Arabic, that had flooded in through the Moslem religion over the centuries. Once started on this program, the Turks did not stop until they made the very revolutionary change of writing their language in the Latin characters of the West, forsaking the Arabic characters which they had used for so long a time. This required everyone in the country to relearn his own language in a new vehicle of writing. This radical language reform, adopted literally overnight with a minimum of confusion and complaint, is a testimony to the enthusiasm with which Turks were facing the new day.

Again the manner in which Kamal drove his less visionary colleagues to speedy action is worthy of being related. He was chafing at the slowness with which the language reform committee was working at their assignment. He had the conviction the move must be made quickly and be drastic in its scope. The committee had been instructed to transliterate the Arabic into the Western Latin alphabet and to provide for the phonetic writing of Turkish words in this new alphabet. It was August, 1928, while he was supposedly vacationing in Istanbul, that he wired Ankara, where the committee was at work, asking for a report on their progress. An evasive, disappointing reply came back. He took typical Kamalian action. He wired that the entire committee should come to Istanbul immediately. He arranged for them to gather at the sumptuous palace of the ex-Sultans. There he entered the room where they were meeting and closed the door behind him in an emphatic

manner. Turning, he spoke sharply: "Gentlemen, you will remain here until your task is completed." The chairman had the temerity to protest that such a radical reform could not be made in less than ten years. Kamal wisely replied: "You know as well as I do that if ten years were allowed you would do nothing for nine and one-half years and then act in the final six months. Therefore, let us do it now." The committee remained in the palace for forty-eight hours until their work had been completed. Then it was enacted into law and put into effect with unbelievable speed. The opening of the schools was delayed until October so that the textbooks for the incoming students would be ready in the new print. By December 15th, all of the newspapers of the country had to be ready with new type and appear thereafter in the new alphabet. As soon as the law was enacted, no books were permitted to be printed in the old alphabet. By June, 1929, the law was completely in effect, including signs, legal documents and all other written and printed forms.

The significance of implementing this reform with such speed can better be grasped when one realizes that it took a Turkish youth three years to learn to read and write his language in the difficult Arabic. The Turkish educational system was growing with utmost speed also, over three hundred new school buildings being opened annually. A whole generation of Turkish students would have been handicapped had the language reform been dragged out over a decade.

In the program which followed over two million adults learned to read and write for the first time. The hopes of the Anatolians were high, and the faith they held in their new leader to achieve great things for them was an asset Kamal forced his party to exploit to the utmost.

As Kamal was double-crossed and frustrated continuously in his early career by corrupt politicians and officeholders who held their personal interests far ahead of the interests of the government, he formulated his rigid concept of integrity to duty in public office. As soon as Turkey came under his leadership, he exacted not only unfailing loyalty to himself and the revolutionary objectives, but a very high sense of honesty and a keen desire for marked achievement in every office of the Republic. He once said, "Other people may like to raise flowers. I take delight in raising public-spirited men. The amateur who raises flowers does not expect any gratitude from his flowers; neither do I." It is one of the distinctive qualities of the new Turkey that its officialdom has stood extremely high in character and accomplishment. It is to be hoped that the second generation may maintain the excellent example, for Turkey cannot afford a return to the corrupt practices of the officeholders of the late Sultan's regime if it is to continue its national advancement.

The old titles of rank such as Hādji, Effendi and Pasha were forbidden. Only Bay and Bayan now appear before the name as we use Mr., Miss and Mrs.

The Moslem day of rest was Friday, but the Grand National Assembly decreed that Sunday be accepted to conform with the West.

Another marked social reform was the action of the Grand National Assembly in 1935 requiring all Turkish citizens to take family names by 1937. Prior to this time only a limited number of Turks had family names. Many interesting family names were coined or taken from places, events or heroes of history. Kamal insisted Ismet should take the name of Inonu because he had been the one to

direct the armies in their wonderful stand at this Turkish village against the Greeks early in 1921.

Bay Hamdula Subi, the former Minister of Education and recent Ambassador to Rumania, took the dignified name of Tanriover, which may be translated, Praiser of God. Tanri was the old Turkish word for God, Allah being Arabic.

The former Vali of Istanbul, who enjoyed mountain climbing, selected as his name, Ustundag, mountain peak. There was a tourist agency to serve foreigners called the National Turkish Touring Agency. In typical American style they had taken the initials to coin the word Natta. One of the ranking employees added the prefix en meaning top, and made for himself the name Enata.

To avoid too great duplication of a popular name it was ruled that only one family in a district could take the same name. This reform has meant a great deal in strengthening the family ties in Turkey. Saracoglou is one of those who have had their family names for many generations. It is interesting to note that the Prime Minister's name means saddler's son. Undoubtedly several generations ago one of his forefathers was a saddler of unusual skill.

The complete emancipation of Turkish women within twelve years of the birth of the Republic was one of the most sensational and significant changes wrought by modern Turkey. During the rise of the Ottoman Empire, the position of the Turkish women steadily deteriorated. Their status was little better than that of chattel, in harems, heavily veiled, responsible for most of the menial tasks and hard labor, and restricted in practically all phases of life but the bearing of children.

Some of the gains accruing to the Turkish women in the

early years of the Turkish Republic were indirect results of other radical changes that were being made, rather than a carefully designed program for their advancement. Under the Empire, with its Islamic law, legal rights and privileges for women were generally nonexistent. When the change occurred, dropping Islamic law and adopting Western codes of law, the entire legal status of women was firmly established on an equality with men. Monogamy became the national law of formerly polygamous Turkey.

National woman suffrage was granted in 1934 by an amendment of the constitution. The next year seventeen Turkish women were elected as deputies to the Grand National Assembly. Thus, within a year of attaining suffrage, the Turkish women assumed a larger share in their national government than exists in any other democratic country in the world. Their economic and social opportunities were seized with an equal avidity. They are to be found in all of the professions, in the shops and in the factories. There is equal pay for equal work in Turkey. Educated Turkish women take greater pride in their democratic rights, duties and privileges than the women of the West.

A national organization known as the People's Houses (Halkevleri) was of great assistance in getting the many radical reforms into effect with popular approval and enthusiasm. These houses were run usually by members of the People's Party and exist in all large cities and every vilayet. They are powerful centers of education and propaganda. Here the people are treated to lectures, entertainments, political rallies and moving pictures. They frequently have the only radio in some of the more remote vilayets as there are probably not more than ten thousand radio sets in all Turkey. They also provide the few

books and newspapers that may be available in the district. The governors and deputies of these houses also have been the direct liaison between the government and the people, making regular tours throughout their districts.

One minority group, the nomadic, backward, fanatically Moslem Kurds, gave the new nationalist regime the greatest opposition. They liked none of the reforms and changes that were being thrust upon them, and resisted in violent, open rebellion, first in 1925, and again in 1937. These Kurdish tribesmen comprised a million and a half people. This is a relatively important percentage of the total population of 18,000,000. Kamal dealt ruthlessly with the revolutionists, putting down their counterrevolutionary efforts with quick military action. No sympathy or quarter was given those responsible. Criticism frequently has been sharp against Kamal and the Nationalist Government for this ruthless suppression. Yet in the interest of national security and unity, the policy followed was unquestionably sound, and actually effected an economy of bloodshed. By these terroristic examples, all Turkish citizens became fully aware that to resist the new regime was dangerous in the extreme. Kamal had an uncanny sense of the exact degree to which he could carry out his program of change. Like a professional poker player, he was able to win the highest stakes on each play.*

Turkey could not hope to hold its hard-won economic independence without launching a tremendous agricultural and industrial program that would make it a far more self-sufficient as well as more highly producing country. Neither could the very low standard of living be materially

* Kamal actually was a keen and skillful poker player. He was a regular winner. But when he left the game he always left his winnings on the table, being unwilling to take his friends' money.


raised nor the grandiose social and educational as well as defense programs be carried out without greatly increased production of both raw materials and manufactured products. Turkey had been an exporter of raw materials and an importer of manufactured articles. Here were fields in which the nation could be streamlined with a vengeance.

The enterprising government immediately encouraged greater agricultural production, diversification of crops, and more scientific farming. Large areas were made productive through irrigation, and vast projects of reforestation and irrigation are being systematically developed. Some measure of their success is evident from the following gains made up to 1939:

Wheat acreage was increased 57% and yield 125%.
Maize acreage was increased 120% and yield 180%.
Rye acreage was increased 120% and yield 180%.
Tobacco and cotton crops have been greatly augmented.

Sugar is an outstanding example of a staple removed completely from Turkey's imports by the development of domestic production. Practically no sugar was produced in Turkey up to 1927. Then the sugar beet industry was established. In three years one-sixth of the nation's consumption was produced. In six years, or by 1933, six-sevenths of the country's requirements were being produced domestically, and now the country is completely self-sufficient in this field.

Kamal realized the need for the utilization of modern science in the development of his country. He once said, "Modern science is international. We shall use it to the full, but we shall take good care to remain Turkish." That



is what Turkey has been doing as rapidly as a poor country could.

As soon as the railroads were taken over by the government their operation was greatly improved. A significant program of rail expansion was wisely promulgated and has been steadily carried out. The railroads were a heterogeneous group of disconnected lines owned by different foreign interests, German, British, French, and others. They were operated as foreigners usually operate foreign concessions, for maximum profit and minimum service. Now Turkey is emerging with a modern, efficient, integrated rail system that is being extended to fulfill the economic and military needs of the nation.

The rail lines taken over were badly off balance and totally inadequate. They were chiefly in the west and south. The north and east were practically unserved. Among the projects completed is the line from Ankara through Karabuk (the new iron and steel center) to Zonguldak on the Black Sea, near which are valuable coal fields. Another line has been put through from Ankara to Kayseri (the cotton-mill center) and thence to Sivas and finally Samsun on the Black Sea. A line was built eastward from Sivas to Erzurum which connects with a line that goes into Russia opening up rail communications with that vast country. Still another line has been extended southeastward from Sivas to Diyarbakir through the heart of the Kurdish area. In the north a railway is projected that will parallel the Black Sea, but be securely distant from the sea. It will connect the Asiatic shores of Istanbul with the Ankara-Zonguldak and the Ankara-Samsun lines. In the southeast a line is being projected north of the Iraq border that will link the country with the town of Siirt where oil has been struck.

Motor roads in Turkey are negligible but progress is evident in overcoming this defect also. There is a road from Istanbul to the Bulgarian border in Thrace. Another road of importance runs from Trabzon to the Iran border and carries a part of that country's trade to the Black Sea for transshipment. The road from Istanbul to Izmir (Smyrna) is passable, but those into the interior terrible in American estimation. A ten-year plan was evolved in 1939 for extensive road building and the national government planned an expenditure of one hundred and twenty million Turkish pounds for this project. To what extent this plan is being implemented is not known, but military necessity undoubtedly has pushed both the rail and road developments faster than originally planned.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Kamal Atatürk

ATATÜRK—FATHER OF THE TURKS. Americans can grasp this title bestowed upon the savior of the Turks. It is the expression of a sincere conviction and the respect of a truly thankful and happy people. Foreigners visiting Turkey who never met Kamal and never saw him actually felt they knew him. They were in his presence and were affected by him as one is affected by a spirit that permeates the atmosphere of a church, a college, a community. His spirit permeated every phase of Turkish life in those fateful years after he resurrected the soul of Turkey from the dead Ottoman body.

He was the embodiment of the new spirit that created and nurtures modern Turkey. He was personally aware of this fact and meritoriously exploited it to the utmost. In the early years of struggle, he most effectively conveyed this understanding to his party officials when he said: "There are two Mustafa Kemals. One is that sitting before you, the Mustafa Kemal of flesh and blood, who will pass away. There is another whom I cannot call 'me.' It is not I that this Mustafa Kemal personifies. It is you—all you present here, who go into the furthestmost parts of the country to inculcate and defend a new ideal, a new mode

of thought. I stand for these dreams of yours. My life's work is to make them come true."

The comment of the Oriental philosopher, Mencius, well applies to the life of Turkey's revolutionary hero. Mencius, over eight hundred years before Christ, pondered wisely, "When heaven is about to confer a great office on any man, it first exercises his mind with suffering; it exposes his body to hunger and subjects him to extreme poverty; it confounds his undertakings. But by all these methods it stimulates his mind, hardens his nature and supplies his incompetences."

The destiny of the boy born in Salonika in 1880 was in no way foreseen, or desired, by the mother who gave him birth, and called him Mustafa. Her name was Zubeyda and the father's name was Ali Riza. She was a Macedonian Turk and he an Albanian, both Turkish subjects and faithful Moslems. Other earlier, unknown blood strains coursed in this boy, just as in those of us who call ourselves Americans. Turkey also has the virility that comes from the blending of many blood streams. But there was never a question in Mustafa's mind that he was anything but Turkish. He had that aggressive loyalty that urged him incessantly to action—living, dreaming, striving for his country's more glorious future. Such patriotism leads to revolution, and successful revolution can lead to tremendous advances of a people and their state.

The life of Mustafa was that of a Horatio Alger character, an uphill fight without let-up. He was not an ordinary child, but rather the exceptional, willful type. He was careful about his appearance as a youngster, haughty though frail, and not a friend maker. He was born to lead, never to follow. Yet in his youth and early manhood he lacked the qualities necessary to win a following. He early

started to clash with his environment, to revolt against the customary controls. These were the harsh precursors to his later struggles. In military school he showed immediate special talent and was especially good in mathematics. His mathematics instructor was also named Mustafa. He decided to give his pupil a distinguishing as well as complementary added name, so called him "kemal" which was the Arabic word for "perfect." This Mustafa retained as his second name, until the futile attempt to purge the language of all Arabic and Persian words necessitated his changing it. Then the Turkish word "kamal" was brought forward as an effective substitute for it may be translated, "the strong and courageous." Today the correct name is Kamal Atatürk.

Mustafa Kemal changed from frail childhood to become a giant in nervous and physical energy. This and his complementary alert mentality led him in two dangerous directions as an officer of the Sultan—dissolute living on the one hand, and revolutionary activity on the other. He drank and loved to excess. He plotted against the Sultan's corrupt regime with an enthusiasm and conviction comparable with all great revolutionists. French Revolutionary ideas and writings were a tremendous influence among the young Turkish officers. Mustafa Kemal imbibed them, along with spirituous liquids, and became eloquent with his plans and ever more active in the secret society, called the Vatan, planning the forcing of reforms on the Sultan's government.

Most revolutionaries are caught before they succeed, and die for their cause without attainment. The Sultan's men early spotted this arch-plotter and he was imprisoned in Constantinople. Death was the usual consequence of such treachery but the Moslem Kismet, which he despised,

seemed to guard Kemal's life, on this, and numerous subsequent occasions, when death appeared inevitable.

Instead of death, he was exiled to Damascus. There, as an officer of the Sultan, he was expected to redeem himself by maintaining order among the Druses, whom the French have found extreme difficulty in ruling. Kemal was a revolutionist at heart, and he never weakened. His commanding officer in Damascus was also a member of the Vatan. This gave him the opportunity to continue his precarious adventures. He even ventured back to Salonika, which was the hotbed of sedition, and was very nearly seized again by the Sultan's agents when he was supposedly doing his duty in the oldest city in the world, "never destroyed by God or man." Were it Kismet or the confusion of a corrupt, inefficient coterie of officials, Kemal escaped detection. Later, through friends, he secured an official transfer back to his favorite haunt, his birthplace, and the city he eventually was to agree should become part of Greece, and cleared of all Turks.

But by this time the exposed Vatan had been superseded by what was known as "The Committee of Union and Progress." In this group, Kemal was able to secure only a minor place. The outstanding figure was Enver Pasha. This committee struck its surprise blow against the tyrannic Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1908 and succeeded in forcing him to restore the constitution. Enver Pasha soon became the "man behind the throne" with Abdul Hamid II forced out and Mehmet V, the weaker Sultan, assuming power.

Here was the beginning of the bitter rivalry between the two ambitious military characters who were to have much to do with the future of their country. Enver Pasha was to have the upper hand a considerable number of years, and

Kemal was to prove a thorn in his flesh, a constant threat to be sidetracked and, if possible, eliminated.

Enver Pasha first disposed of Kemal by sending him to France in 1910, on an observation trip of military maneuvers. On his return, Kemal became the director of the Officers' School in Salonika. Mighty events were to occur in rapid succession. The Italians struck in Libya in 1911. Another far-flung section of the Empire was in danger of being lost. Both Enver Pasha and Kemal went to Libya to try to save it for the Sultan. But Enver was in charge of the fighting and Kemal was only a critical under-officer. Kemal was a far better strategist who could and did point out the blunders of Enver, sharpening the hatred between the two.

The first Balkan War broke upon the weakening Turks. Libya was thrown to the Italians, along with the Dodecanese Islands. The hold of "the sick man of Europe" was insecure. Kemal returned to do his part to strengthen the slowly slipping grip. He commanded well the troops that were under him and continued to accumulate invaluable battle experience, as well as the reputation of being a capable military leader. But the Ottoman grip on Europe was loosened more and more. Kemal morosely understood why, but he was helpless to change the course of events that was prying it open. Yet Enver Pasha held his power by shrewdly turning the adverse developments to his advantage. The end of the Balkan Wars allowed Kemal to be relegated to temporary obscurity as Military Attache to the Turkish Ambassador at Sofia, Bulgaria.

The First World War broke in 1914. The Sultan, still under the influence of Enver Pasha soon placed the Turkish forces on the side of the Kaiser and the Central Powers. Mustafa Kemal was one of the few Turkish leaders who

foresaw this as a major catastrophe for the tottering Ottoman Empire. He let his opinion be known frequently throughout the war, to his personal detriment.

But Kemal's Kismet was again his good fortune. Enver Pasha thought he was shoving Kemal into an obscure post by having him stationed on Gallipoli. Here the British were to attempt their land operations to aid in forcing their way through the Dardanelles. Their plan was to seize the Straits and Constantinople, and open up this route to move much needed supplies to their ally Russia.

A real stroke of luck now befell Kemal. By pure chance his troops were on early morning practice maneuvers along an ordinarily unguarded section of the coast when the British supposedly surprise landing was attempted. Kemal grasped the situation in an instant, and made drastic decisions of his own. He had his troops break off their practice immediately and engage the enemy. Recklessly he pushed all of his forces into the fight, holding nothing in reserve. It was daring to the point of being foolhardy without adequate knowledge of the general situation. Kemal's gamble probably saved the Turkish positions, and, eventually, the whole campaign. A grueling, bloody campaign ensued, with the result hanging precariously in the balance. Then came the British decision to withdraw. This allied debacle of 1915 was credited in large measure to the persistent, fearless leadership of a relatively small part of the Turkish forces led by Mustafa Kemal.

He flaunted death constantly, exposing himself by being present in the front-line trenches most of the time, encouraging, inspiring and leading his men on their attacks. On one occasion he took an advance position, alone, to observe the battle area. Directed firing from a British Naval unit showed they had spotted this lone lookout for

annihilation. Steadily the fire moved more accurately toward its objective. Kemal would not withdraw, and thus show weakness or fear. He defied death as it came screeching at him. Calmly he lit a cigarette, as the successive shell bursts indicated the next would hit the bull's-eye. His troops watched and waited for the inevitable. The firing ceased. To them, it was miraculous. In their simple, deep-seated Islamic faith, this dauntless, indefatigable leader was the living demonstration of their belief in Kismet. On another occasion, at the very end of the campaign, hit by a shell fragment, his watch saved him.

When a short truce was agreed upon to collect and bury the dead and remove the wounded, Kemal donned a soldier's uniform and went over to the British lines, not only assisting in handling the dead and wounded, but carefully observing the enemies' positions, their general situation and condition. Kemal embraced the winning qualities for hard fought, exhausting battles where the final victory depends upon the narrow margin of the dominant human will to fight on, through the last gasping breath.

Victory had been very close for the British when they forsook their attempt and sailed away. Not only to the soldiers, who had fought so valiantly under him, but to the worried people in Constantinople, Kemal had saved the city and the Sultan's throne. His fame spread rapidly.

Enver, increasingly jealous of Kemal's rising popularity, resolved to check this fellow by sending him off to the Russian front. There almost anything might befall this man, who always seemed ready to challenge his leadership. The real danger point was now the Russian border, and Enver well knew the incompetence of Turkish arms to resist the expected invasion. Taking command where crushing defeat appeared imminent, Kemal found the

forces at his disposal underequipped and badly disease-ridden.

He worked prodigiously and found he had two capable officers to assist him. One was Colonel Ismet, Chief of Staff. The other was Kiasim Kara Bekir Pasha. He was impressed particularly by the Colonel, whose military abilities compared so favorably with his own. This Colonel Ismet (later Ismet Inonu) was destined to be Kemal's right-hand man in the terrific two decades of struggle until Kemal's death. Appeals were made to Constantinople for the provision of vital needs, but Enver Pasha saw nothing was delivered. Kismet again rescued the situation for Kemal, this time in the form of the Russian revolution.

There was little time for relaxation for men like Kemal, in spite of the Russian collapse. With the pressure on the Russian front eliminated by the Bolshevik revolution, his military skill was called for in the south, where the British were sowing seeds of revolt among the Arabs. There Kemal disagreed with the German General von Falkenhayn, who was in complete charge of the Ottoman forces in that area. He became more and more deeply embittered that his country's future had been entangled with these Prussian, domineering, would-be world conquerors, who were using the Turks, as inferiors, to serve their own selfish ends. His keen understanding of the situation was the more exasperating because he was alone, and without power to do anything about it. He angrily insisted upon being relieved of his command, and historians will long continue to conjecture as to why his whim was granted.

Back in Constantinople, the government decided to send him to Germany with the Crown Prince Vahdettin. On this mission he was to meet the Kaiser, Von Hindenburg, and Ludendorff, to question their strategy and to reinforce

his opinion that the Germans would lose the war. He was vociferous in his denunciation of the Germans to the Ottoman Crown Prince, and earnestly worked to show him what was wrong and how he, Kemal, might still redeem the situation, if entrusted with the direction of the affairs of the Empire. He knew he was talking to the probable next Sultan, and he was not missing the opportunity to build himself up in Vahdettin's eyes. What he could not foresee was that this man would very soon become Sultan; that as Sultan he was to fear Kemal, later to sign the decree for his death, and finally to flee on a British warship leaving Kemal to create the new Nationalist Turkish State.

Kemal was hospitalized in Germany, seriously ill, when the Crown Prince returned to Constantinople. Sultan Mehmet V died and the Crown Prince Vahdettin became Sultan Mehmet VI.

The war grew steadily worse for the Turks in Palestine and Arabia. When Kemal returned from Germany, though weak from his illness, he was ordered to Syria as Commander of the Seventh Army Corps. Defeat was overwhelming the Turkish armies when he assumed command. His task was the humiliating and difficult one of ordering a retreat, and trying to save as many of his troops as he could by getting them back into the mountains of Anatolia. The British with the aid of the Arabs, led by Lawrence, had badly defeated the forces of the Sultan. Kemal's hatred for the Arab fifth columnists, as well as the British, was unbounded. The war ended for the Turks with the signing of the armistice at Mudros.

Kemal, back in the capital, was as restless and rebellious as a newly caged lion. His constant thoughts were on what the Allies would do to his country and what he might do to counter their decisions. There was no resistance left in

the group around the Sultan. They had a deplorable resignation to the inescapable fate awaiting their country. Enver Pasha had fled the country in his fear. Seeming to sense the dangerous threat Kemal was to their unannounced plans, the British wanted to deport him to Malta.

But once again the fates smiled on Kemal. Instead of the British deporting him, the Sultan sent him to the interior of Anatolia as Inspector General of the Northeastern Area. Even after he sailed, it is contended, the British sent a warship to overtake his ship before it reached Samsun, to bring Kemal back. If so, it was too late. Kemal moved into Anatolia to carry out his plans, as recorded in previous chapters. Perilous insurrection, killing before being killed, living and fighting from place to place, hopelessly the underdog, he never relaxed. At the most critical stage of the war against the Greeks, his horse fell on him and broke several ribs. But nothing could stop him and his indomitable will.

It is impossible to evaluate accurately the work of a contemporary. That can only be done by historians, who view the panorama of the world after several centuries. It will reveal to them the exact impact he has made on the course of the human race. It has been great and now appears to rate constructive significance. Not only did Kemal destroy the remaining vestiges of the decadent power of the Sultan-Caliph, but he created a new, virile, national power, which still has his unconquerable will to survive.

Modern Turkey exists as it is today because of this one man more than any other single factor. His long years of loyal struggle to preserve the Empire of the Sultan thoroughly taught him the lessons he applied when power finally came to him.

He realized the necessity of forsaking absolutely the Em-

pire's lost hold over non-Turk subject people, and of integrating the new nation ethnically around those people who proudly thought of themselves as Turks.

He realized, as few did, the necessity of expurgating, resolutely and thoroughly, religious power from the government.

He believed that he must fight any and all foreign powers, until he could break their strangle hold on the economic life and get them to accept Turkey as a free, independent and sovereign nation. It was inevitable that he should develop a strong xenophobia from the continual bitter experiences he had with foreign nations and non-Turkish Ottoman subjects.

Yet there remained his realization that Turkey could not avoid dealing with the nations which had plotted against its very existence. Turkey was so strategically located that its geography and the selfish conflicting interests of the leading world powers made isolation impossible. There was the compulsion to grow as strong and nationalistic as possible, with utmost rapidity. There was the complementary requirement to cultivate as many strong friends as possible, all of whom could and would have a selfish desire to keep Turkey strong and independent, as a buffer nation against their enemies.

Kemal understood this fundamental issue and directed the shrewd international policy of his new nation. He had a clear vision of the threat of Germany, which he had proclaimed unsuccessfully during the First World War, and retained till his death. *Time* magazine has paraphrased his legendary belief and advice to his successors in these words: "For as long as you can honorably do so, keep Turkey out of war. But if you must go to war, don't fight on Germany's side. With Germany you lose if you win."

Kemal combined the essential qualities, and through his harrowing, toughening experiences was superbly equipped, at the exact moment, to do the unique and remarkable task that made him one that history will acclaim great. It may be explained as Providence, Kismet, or simply happenstance. Those who have lived when he lived and recognized his contribution to humanity should not err about his human frailties. His private life was at times a pattern of debauchery. The only redeeming feature was that he was not hypocritical about it. The outstanding fact is that only an earthy and primitive individual could have accomplished what he achieved. The combination of personal traits in part low and rough, in part lofty and sublime, produced the character for the time and task. The low were indispensable for the ruthless disposal of centuries of corruption, corrosion and slime. The sublime were essential to incalculable service to others.

CHAPTER NINE

Outsmarting the Smart

THE DEATH OF KAMAL came at a very critical moment for Turkey. Could this young, immature nation weather the international storms gathering about her without the guiding genius of her master builder? It had seemed that he, and he alone, had been capable of protecting his creation from the frequent maelstroms that constantly threatened to engulf her. Was there another Turk capable of taking over and completing his unfinished work?

Kamal had razed the ghostly skeleton of the Sultan's old Empire, which the Allies had left standing as a scarecrow to mark their vengeance and to frighten others in the East who might be tempted to challenge their power. He had cleared the ground of the wreckage. He had blueprinted a modern nation to be erected on the main two-continent site astride the Straits. He had streamlined it in the latest Western style architecture. Motifs had been accepted from many Western nations, and had been blended into the plan for a modern Turkey. They combined to make an altogether pleasing, highly utilitarian edifice, bold and admirable, on the architect's drafting boards. Kamal had laid deep foundations on solid rock that his new state

might endure the ravages of time. He had done much in so short a time.

But now another architect-contractor must be found with the will, the resources, and the skill to advance the building of the superstructure. Otherwise it was destined to be sabotaged and dismantled, like many another grandiose project of bygone ages, similarly conceived and well started by its creator, only to fall into discard after his demise.

Kamal Ataturk died November 10, 1938. The next day the People's Party nominated, and the Grand National Assembly elected, Ismet Inonu the second President of the Republic of Turkey. Turkey, on the twentieth anniversary of the Armistice, chose for its leader the man who had negotiated so successfully its peace with the outside world. He was destined to try to maintain that peace for his people, when practically all the rest of the world was to be engulfed in another war. The shadows of the Second World War cast their reflection over the blue skies of Ankara, even as the Grand National Assembly made their fateful choice.

Inonu was probably Kamal's choice as his successor even though a serious break in their friendship in 1937 had resulted in Inonu withdrawing from public office. He was also the people's choice. He was the best possible choice that could be made. But could he succeed as Kamal had succeeded? Fortunately, he and his close associates were the experienced staff who, in a large measure, had made possible Kamal's success. They had learned the game of international diplomacy with him, and yet, in the next few years, could Inonu divert the storm of war, slowly moving through the Balkans southeastward? Turkey was directly in its path. But its cyclonic forces were to be split.

One storm veered to the north, and one to the south, sweeping uncomfortably close along Turkey's three exposed sides. Today, Turkey stands in the heart of the storm area, with a temporary, menacing calm brooding over her.

These are five years of mystifying success to analyze carefully. Surely such success, if properly analyzed and appraised, can be a guide to the future in the Near East and the Balkans. Turkey is the key to the East. Most of the secret diplomacy and much of the intrigue of these years remain concealed.

First, in such an analytical review, must come the successor of Kamal—Ismet Inonu. Some measure of the political stature of this second personal dictator of Turkey can now be made. There are those who rate him the most skillful diplomat in Europe. He is one of the most brilliant national administrators. Others classify him among the foremost leaders in the world today. Shrewd military strategist and master statesman are a rare combination in one man, but certainly Inonu is both. Joseph Stalin's reported appraisal of Turkey's ruler confirms those who highly acclaim him: "The only man outside Russia, whose advice I respect, is Inonu."

In his steady, untiring devotion to his leader, Inonu had actually achieved many of the greatest victories for the credit and glory of Ataturk. He had won, singlehanded, the peace at Lausanne. He had negotiated most of the international peace front for his country, which had done more than anything else to restore Turkey to a position of respect at the world's council chambers. He had pioneered and developed many of the radical internal reforms. In the light of these facts, there can be small wonder the building of modern Turkey has continued uninterrupted under

his inspired, if less colorful leadership. Turkey has been strengthened, rather than weakened, by being forced "to change horses in midstream," through the early death of the now sainted Kamal.

No gossip or scandal tarnishes the record of Inonu. He fits the ideal of a leader of a Moslem people more than did Kamal. He is a quiet, family man with three children (two sons and a daughter), reverently religious and a very light drinker. He attained his position as dictator wholly through merit, without bitter factional fighting or personal promotion. In spite of his long career through hard, blood-flowing, fearful years, no one seems to know a solitary enemy of this man among his fellow Turks. He was prematurely old, at fifty-four, on that November day he assumed the duties of the highest office of his country. Therefore, all Turkey prays for his continued life and strength. He has their faith and allegiance. His death will never come from riotous living, but it may come inopportunately from overwork, and the tremendous strain on his small shoulders. He has a solid home front and an experienced staff of associates including Sucru Saracoglou, Prime Minister; Numan Menemencioglu, Foreign Minister; and Fevzi Cakmak, Chief of Staff.

The character traits that have achieved for Inonu his present eminence are now obvious to students of his career. They are integrity, patience and a thorough knowledge and understanding of his problems, his opponents, and his goals. He has known well that Turkey alone, a poor, undeveloped small nation, could never match one of the Great Powers. He knew also the bargaining strength of Turkey's strategic position, astride the crossroads of the world.

Turkey's interests (Inonu's only interests) could be

secured and maintained only by utilizing the conflicting interests of Russia, Great Britain, Germany and the lesser European powers. Coupled with this strategy was the necessity of manifesting a keen desire to strengthen friendly relationships with all, forsaking aggression by his country and deploring and countering, within limits, aggression by others. Because of the nature of the diplomatic game, with its elements of secrecy and intrigue, patient bluffing had its place. Yet, fundamentally, his procedure has been forthright diplomacy, based on equity of rights and interests. As seen in the earlier chapter on his successfully championed peace, his straightforward approach to all international issues with all nations established his reputation and expedited his attainments.

The primary aim of Turkey's foreign policy was, and is, self-preservation as an independent, sovereign nation.

The one international explosive force in Turkey was its control of the vital, strategic land and water routes between the two continents, so frequently pointed out. In late 1938, as Inonu took office, and the rumbling thunder of the approaching Second World War was heard, the Turks were more disappointed than alarmed. They felt quite secure in their carefully cultivated friendships with the leading powers, with the possible exception of Italy.

Russia was their closest friend and powerful neighbor. This great country, rapidly growing in strength, had befriended them first in the trying early days of their revolution. Soviet Russia had renounced the Czarist ambitions to seize the Straits and Constantinople. This had been done in 1921 when both Russia and Turkey, struggling to make their revolutions stick, seemingly had no other friends in the world. Russia had been the first to assist Turkey with foreign credits for her badly needed indus-

trial development, and by suggestions on her five-year plan. The Soviets had championed Turkey's cause at Lausanne in 1923, and again at Montreux in 1936, when Turkey secured her complete independence and sovereignty over her country. Yes, Turkey could most certainly count on Russian friendship in any future crisis that might arise with Germany or Great Britain. Whom else need she fear?

Great Britain had turned from enemy to ally also during those years from 1923 to 1938. Only one serious question had remained between Britain and Turkey, after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, and that was over Mosul. This problem had been settled in 1926. Great Britain realized that the Turks had no intention of stirring up the Moslem world against Britain, or of regaining domination over the Arabs, or of fostering (with themselves as leaders) a Pan-Islamic movement. The Turks had clearly demonstrated that they wanted only peace and security, with absolute sovereignty over their homeland. Great Britain, therefore, well chose to cultivate Turkey's close friendship. Both countries disliked Mussolini's empire-building ambitions that actually threatened Turkey. The British, in 1936, had readily agreed to Turkey's desires to fortify the Straits. A friendly Turkey, in complete control of these fortified areas, might well be the badly needed bastion against German expansion eastward, and Russian expansion southward. A really strong Turkey, under Inonu, was a British Empire asset, without question, by 1938, and the British even started to subsidize Turkish efforts to strengthen herself.

Hitler's Germany had been moving forward rapidly. The Turks were not unmindful of this rising might. Like those of a giant octopus, three of Hitler's powerful tentacles had been spread out to take strangle holds on the

Balkan countries. By mid-1939, they had secure grips, which could not be thrown off. The first tentacle enmeshed the government. If unsuccessful or uncertain results were being obtained, it surreptitiously encouraged and backed indigenous Nazi movements within the country. Often it did both. The second tentacle wormed its way in to take a strangle hold on the economic life of the country. With the third tentacle, he crushed the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact in order to smash all the Balkan ties for mutual protection.

His first tentacle could not take a firm grip on the Turkish government. He was dealing with a realistic, shrewd and experienced crowd in Ankara. Turkey was not healthy ground for developing an indigenous Nazi movement, any more than it had been susceptible to communism. But the Turkish diplomats in the Balkan capitals had been unable to prevent the third tentacle from crushing the instrument that had been created to sustain the status quo.

The second tentacle, fastening its hold on the economic life of the Balkans, was irresistible and it included Turkey in its powerful, unrelenting grip. The Balkans were indispensable to the Nazi machine, as a source of supplies for the impending war. Herr Schacht and his staff had manipulated the whole Balkan foreign trade into Nazi hands. Everything was placed on a barter system. It eliminated entirely the payment of any cash through foreign exchange. When the cost of what Germany took exceeded what she supplied, the nation would have a credit in Germany, for the balance, in blocked marks. Even the balances of trade between Balkan nations were carried in Germany. Those with favorable balances could not collect in cash. As early as 1937, Schacht had manipulated this tentacle

into its strangle hold on all the foreign trade in the Balkans. In return, Germany frequently failed in delivery of manufactured goods, or gave shoddy merchandise at exorbitant prices which the countries had no alternative but to accept. Linked with the trade control, Germany placed heavy investments strategically throughout the Balkans, to gain control of the mining industries, such as copper, lead, zinc, antimony and mercury. The Nazis even inveigled these countries to shift some of their food crops to industrial crops to serve the rising needs of the monstrous war machine that was in the making.

Turkey had no choice but to be friendly with the Nazis. The Turks had found Germany to be their best customer and a willing helper in their program of industrialization. By 1938, over fifty per cent of Turkey's exports and fifty-five per cent of her import trade was with Germany. This was definitely too much trade with one nation for a sound economy, free from outside pressure, but there was friendly Russia on the one hand and friendly England on the other. Germany had been quite helpful with Turkey's railroad expansion program. She had provided credits and technicians. Other contributions from the Reich were technical military assistance, building of submarines, and the supplying of the guns to fortify the Straits. Relations with Germany were officially friendly, but the Ankara government held the same conviction regarding Germany as had Kamal over the years from the beginning of the First World War.

France, with its mandate over Syria to Turkey's south, had manifested a strong desire to be friendly with Turkey. Relationships with the Balkan States, and with neighboring states to the east, had been meticulously cultivated and could scarcely be better. Turkey appeared secure in her

international position, as well as in her internal unity and stability, when Inonu inherited Kamal's office.

But Hitler had Europe seething with an air of dread for the evil days fast approaching, and he was capitalizing on this fear and lack of unity among Great Britain, France and Russia, not to mention the smaller nations of Europe. The Soviets had long clamored for a united front against Hitler, but the Conservatives in England could not yield to a program of playing on the same team with the Communists. Chamberlain's appeasement program was being pressed instead, and there had been the historical meeting of the great four, Hitler and Mussolini, bulldozing; Chamberlain and Daladier, kowtowing. Chamberlain flew home from Munich (September, 1938) with his umbrella and a scrap of paper, supposedly, "Peace in our time." Where was Joseph Stalin? Coldly ignored and at what price! In March, 1939, Czechoslovakia was sacrificed to the Nazis.

Two items in the spring of 1939 should be noted for they pointed to an important event of the fall. In May, Chamberlain informed Parliament that a mutual assistance treaty with Turkey was under consideration. Six weeks later France and Turkey signed such a pact, France having ceded the long disputed Sandjak of Alexandretta to Turkey. It was a significant rapprochement.

The spring and summer months of 1939 were spent in feverish activity in this international game of diplomacy. The Soviets, rejected and forsaken, changed their course. Steps were taken to turn Hitler from his eastern ambitions or delay the day. If Chamberlain was determined to divert war to the east, Stalin must try to force it west.

The political bombshell came on August 23. Hitler and Stalin signed their nonaggression pact! It was trumpeted to the world! How badly British diplomacy had floun-

dered! The stage setting was completed and the curtain could be drawn up on the Second World War. It opened September 1 with the German invasion of Poland.

This political bombshell appeared to have dynamite in it for Turkey as well, and the leaders at Ankara raised their eyebrows in querulous wonderment. What was their closest ally, Russia, up to? Could Stalin be forsaking Inonu in this new deal with Hitler? Such double-crossing in the game of international diplomacy had happened before under the alibi of political expediency. Ominous also had been Hitler's quick dispatch of his archplotter, von Papen, to Ankara. Had Russia become the hungry bear of old, prowling for more territory to devour? Was Stalin reverting to the ambitions of the Czars?

The Turks were not long in learning the answers. Saracoglou was in Moscow within a few days at the Soviet's invitation! He was given a royal reception with great fanfare and then allowed to cool his heels in the Kremlin, unable to get the assurances he so badly needed. He was there to be reassured by Stalin that Russia still held to her Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925 in spite of this war-avoidance move with Hitler. The impression given the world was that he was not reassured but, to the contrary, greatly disillusioned as to what might be ahead for Turkey.

It was reported that he was informed that Russia intended to take over Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Rumania. Bulgaria was to be given the Dobrudja, that narrow strip of Rumania adjoining the Bulgarian border between the Danube and the Black Sea. Russia warned that it would do nothing to protect Turkey if attacked by Germany, but insisted that Turkey guarantee

the neutralization of the Straits. What a flouting of Turkey's interests by their supposedly best friend.

There is another more recent version, however, as to what actually transpired between the Russians and Saracoglou at Moscow. It needs to be noted here for its possible correctness though not believed by the author. This version holds that Stalin revealed his plans to Saracoglou but urged the Turks to manifest concern that Russia might be deserting them when Stalin was, in fact, giving definite reassurances. He actually may have recommended that Turkey enter the Tripartite Pact of Mutual Assistance with France and Great Britain so that those nations would also be committed to helping defend Turkey at the Straits against Germany. If true, this was farsighted, shrewd maneuvering on the part of Stalin.

Back in Ankara, Saracoglou needed only days to put the finishing touches on the Tripartite Pact of Mutual Assistance which was signed there on October 19 by the ambassadors of Great Britain and France and by Saracoglou for Turkey. Chamberlain interrupted Parliament that evening to report the good news. It was chalked up as the first really successful diplomatic deal that the lamentable Chamberlain government had been able to achieve, but it was highly significant. Stalin's get-together with Hitler had forced Turkey to rely on her old enemies of the First World War, now very important friends—Great Britain and France.

Just what did the Tripartite Pact of Mutual Assistance provide for the contracting parties? There were five major provisions and a special exemption provision for Turkey.

1. France and Great Britain were committed to give

- Turkey "all aid and assistance" if it were attacked by a European power.
2. All three countries would help one another if a European power attacked any one of them in the Mediterranean.
 3. Turkey would render Britain and France "all assistance" if they became involved in war while carrying out their pledges to protect Rumania and Greece against aggression.
 4. If Turkey found she could not give such aid in case of an attack by Russia on Rumania, she would at least consult with them and maintain a benevolent neutrality.
 5. If a European power attacked any other nation in such a way as to menace the three, all would consult with a view to common action.

The exemption clause attached by Turkey was relative to Russia. Turkey secured exemption on her part to any action that might lead to war with the U. S. S. R. In spite of what Russia appeared to be doing to Turkey, the Turks were unwilling to do anything to impair their Russian ties.

There were some significant omissions. Nothing was written about the Straits being kept open or well fortified. Nothing was mentioned about Iraq or Iran, Syria or any of the other Near or Middle East countries. There probably were some unwritten understandings and secret clauses.

As worded and as given to the world, it was a very definite pronouncement that Turkey's territorial integrity was now protected by France and Great Britain against German or Italian aggression. But some observers could see that it would cover other exigencies if Russia decided to try to seize the Straits. For had not this country started to

demonstrate its greed for more territory? Before Saracoglou was in Moscow, the Russian troops had crossed the Polish border, and a large section of that country was reclaimed by the Soviets. And Russia's war on Finland was soon to be another indication of a changed heart on the part of Stalin. Turkey had moved warily and quickly to strengthen her right for self-preservation.

More of Hitler's tentacles were moving through the Balkans and coming ever closer to Turkey's throat. When and how would he attempt to strangle Turkish sovereignty? Hungary had been taken over easily because of an acceding government willing to act for the Nazis. It had been rewarded by a return, from Rumania, of a part of Transylvania which had been taken from it at the close of the First World War. Much was being stripped from Rumania before it was finally to be placed completely in the hands of the Nazis by the Iron Guard.

Bulgaria was known to be pro-Nazi under King Boris and was to be rewarded with the Dobrudja. It would open the way for the Nazi divisions to Turkey's borders. Yugoslavia and Greece were under severe pressure. The Balkans were being mauled pretty badly by the end of 1939. In spite of the actions of several of the Balkan countries, Turkey moved closer into the orbit of the British and French for better or for worse.

Though Germany was the only country willing to trade extensively with Turkey, the Turks attempted to draw away from her. They did not renew their trade agreements with the Nazis and for a few months Turkey's trade was paralyzed. Britain stepped in with another credit, this time for twenty-five million pounds sterling, and planned to take more of Turkey's exports, previously sent to Germany.

British firms stepped in to expand Turkey's industrial resources. Already British contractors were erecting new power stations and had completed the Karabuk steel works. British shipbuilders worked on ships for the Turkish Mercantile Marine. There were projects developed for the improvement of Turkish harbors and modern loading and unloading facilities. The British firm of Sir Alexander Gibb was economic adviser to the Turkish government. The British were exerting their utmost in behalf of their new, though neutral, ally.

Nineteen hundred and forty was all Hitler's on the battlefields, from beginning to end. Who by that year's end could stand up to the challenge of the mighty conqueror? Denmark and Norway went first, followed by Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg. There had been Britain's wonderful but tragic Dunkirk; Italy's "stab in the back" and France was written off. The heavy night air raids on London had started in September. Germany, Italy and Japan signed their Tripartite Pact. Italy had started on her attempted conquest of Greece.

It had been a bitter year for neutral Turkey. Her foreign trade had shrunk to the vanishing point. The strain on the national economy was serious. Floods and earthquakes had taken their toll of 30,000 dead and 100,000 homeless. A million and a half farm animals had also been lost. Taxes went up twenty-five to fifty per cent. The cost of living mounted. An army of a million men had to be kept mobilized. Von Papen was not letting any opportunity slip by. Pressure was exerted to renew her trade with her faithful old customers, the Nazis. In July 1940, the Turks were driven to sign a new commercial agreement with Germany for twenty-one million Turkish pounds to avoid economic collapse. The Germans outdid themselves in generous

dealing. They also desperately needed Turkish products, particularly chrome. Germany took responsibility for the transportation of all imports and exports to and from Turkey.

Yet Turkey remained loyal to Britain. She covered all Britain's requirements in mohair and chrome before delivering either of these items to Germany. And the Turkish press continued its pro-British, anti-Nazi tone.

But what was on the minds of the leaders at Ankara as 1940 passed into history? Had they placed their hopes and committed themselves to the losers again in this war? What was to be their fate? Certainly New Year's Eve, looking into black 1941, was no time for celebration in Ankara.

Very mysterious to the outside world was the unknown reason why Turkey had not come to the aid of France by declaring war on Italy when Italy struck France. Surely the terms of the Tripartite Pact of Mutual Assistance called for immediate action. Yet no word came from France and Britain, calling upon Turkey to fight, or accusing Turkey of failure to keep her treaty commitments. The mystery lay in the secret clauses of the pact which had called for Britain and France to supply certain essentials of war to the Turks. Britain and France, themselves terribly unprepared for the blitz style warfare, had found it physically impossible to fulfill their treaty obligations to the Turks. These military supply obligations were prerequisites to Turkey's active participation in the war. Turkey had not failed France or Britain but they had failed Turkey. They had no choice, and Turkey had no choice but to strive to maintain Turkey's neutrality against a victorious, onward marching Germany.

Early 1941 did not make matters better in Turkey. Von Papen was sowing seeds of distrust and displaying some of

his old time cunning. The Turco-Bulgarian Pact of Mutual Friendship came unexpectedly in February. What did it mean? Bulgaria had ambitions that might involve seizing Turkish territory. It had held out on the Balkan Pact because of these territorial ambitions. Already Germany had provided for the return of Dobrudja to Bulgaria from Rumania.

Bulgaria was a tool of the Nazis. The Nazis well knew the terms of Turkey's pact with Britain and France. They knew of Turkey's sympathy with Greece. They also knew what they intended to do next in the Balkans. This pact between Bulgaria and Turkey was fostered to keep Turkey neutral while they overran Yugoslavia and Greece.

In the next few months Germany staged its steady march through these countries and on into the islands of the Aegean and into Crete in the Mediterranean. The Nazis linked themselves with the Italians in the Dodecanese Islands, in sight of Turkey's mainland.

The outside world was mystified again that Turkey had not assumed what its neutrals had come to believe were her treaty obligations to Yugoslavia and Greece, under the Balkan Pact. Actually the Turks were not under any treaty obligation to come to the aid of these countries. The Balkan Pact provided co-operative defense only if any of the boundaries of the four signatories were violated by a Balkan nation. A violation by a non-Balkan nation, such as Italy or Germany, was not specifically provided for. Moreover, the German penetration and pressure had, by 1936, become so great on the three governments that had formed the Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia) in 1921, that they were forced to relinquish their fifteen-year-old agreement. Then in early 1937, that same Nazi pressure had resulted in Yugoslavia and

Bulgaria signing an agreement never to war against each other. As the Bulgars had openly and continuously indicated they wanted Dobrudja back from Rumania, and an outlet to the Aegean (which could only be secured at the expense of Greece or Turkey), Yugoslavia clearly repudiated her obligations to Rumania, Greece and Turkey under the Balkan Pact by making this treaty with Bulgaria. The Balkan Pact thus had been shattered by Hitler long before the Second World War had started.

Neither had Turkey joined the British in fulfillment of her treaty obligations in the Mediterranean. But none of these nations was accusing the Turks of failure to live up to treaty obligations. None could. It appeared also that all felt Turkey should husband her strength for a later and probably more propitious moment. All were aware Turkey's security was tied to an Allied victory. The Turks maintained a strict and very difficult neutrality. But they insisted that violation of their territory by anyone meant war.

During this very time British engineers were busily constructing airfields, building roads and improving the railroads in the vicinity of Adana for the Turkish government. Preparations had to be made hastily for the defense of Turkey in case her neutrality was violated by the Germans attempting to land and march through southern Asia Minor from their nearby bases in the Dodecanese Islands. Britain and Turkey were closely collaborating to meet with all their combined might (which was not too much) any such eventuality. But the Germans chose not to antagonize Turkey and force her into the war on the side of Britain. Turkey was like Sweden, a neutral that was supplying some of the essentials of the Nazi war machine.

Britain was having plenty of trouble with Rommel in

North Africa, even though he had been driven back and seemingly stripped of offensive power for the time. The British had had to weaken their North African forces to help in the defense of Greece and Crete. The Arabs were restive over the influx of Jewish refugees. Iraq was obstreperous and had to be pacified. Turkey had offered to mediate. The Germans appeared poised for a lunge into Syria. It was not clear, for the moment, who controlled Syria—the Nazi-controlled Vichy government or the Free French under De Gaulle. Britain rushed forces north to prevent them from gaining this foothold in Asia. These were the darkest hours for the British in the Near East.

Just as it was blackest for the British fighting, it was blackest for the Turks waiting. Would the Germans practically encircle Turkey before forcing its capitulation to the Nazi might? In this critical hour Turkey revealed her noblest qualities. She befriended her war-ravaged neighbor, Greece, in a way never to be forgotten. Britain's food blockade of all conquered Europe was and remains rigid. But Moslem Turkey, Britain's neutral ally, would not tolerate such a blockade against defeated Greece. She refused to respect a policy that would spell starvation to the people of Greece after they had fought so valiantly in defense of their homeland. She started sending food, clothing and medical supplies from her meager resources even though some of her ships of mercy were sunk. This was not just a single gesture or act for show. With a poor wheat crop in 1941, it became necessary to ration bread in Turkish cities while some of their flour was being generously given to the starving Greeks. Aid has continued to flow to Greece from Turkey and is her sincere expression of sympathy. It is the more remarkable that Turkey's determined befriending of Greece has forced the only break

yet allowed by the British in their food blockade. Herbert Hoover in a radio broadcast on October 19, 1941, made the following statement: "The Turks are Moslems—they are not Christians. I wish that Belgium, Poland, Norway, and the others had a friend as compassionate as Turkey."

In desperation, according to Russian dispatches, the Turks signed a non-aggression pact with Germany on June 18. This was a very shrewd diplomatic move on the part of the Turks and may well have had the advance knowledge and blessing of the British. They were in no position to render substantial aid to the Turks had the Germans decided to force their way across Turkey.

Success was going to the head of the Nazis. Victory was coming too easily. Nothing could stand before their blitz. They became grandiose in their strategy. Without waiting to complete their task of knocking out the British, now hanging on the ropes, they moved swiftly into Russia. Their recent non-aggression pact with Stalin was thrown overboard—just another scrap of paper. This surprise attack started the morning of June 22, 1941, four days after the Turco-German non-aggression pact had been signed. Turkey's two great potential protectors from the Nazis were now under attack from Hitler's legions. Turkey, militarily quite weak, could most wisely remain neutral and feverishly continue its development of defensive strength. Allied strategy would not benefit by having her join the fight at this critical juncture. A benevolently neutral Turkey was best for Russia and for Britain.

Von Papen and his staff of propagandists in Ankara were busy warning the Turks that Stalin had earlier approached Hitler for his consent to the annexation by Russia of the Straits. They twisted Churchill's speech made at the time of Russia's entrance into the war. Churchill

indicated that Russia had not benefited from the 1918 victory which she had helped achieve. According to the Nazi propagandists, Churchill was referring to the secret agreements of the First World War which granted Russia the Straits. It was a sharp, bitter attack. Stalin took the trouble to deny categorically the charges directly to the Turkish officials. Then in August Russia and Britain separately guaranteed unilateral assistance to Turkey if she were attacked.

As the summer faded into fall, the fate of Russia hung in the balance. At this critical juncture (October, 1941) pressure was being put on the Ankara officials by Germany's master of trade negotiations—the pugnacious, fat and scarfaced Dr. Clodius. He made four demands:

Thousands of tons of chrome and wheat,
Cancellation of trade commitments to Great Britain,
Readjustment of Turco-German exchange rate,
Long-term credit agreement.

The response stands as a tribute to the audacity of Turkish officials and their loyalty to the Allied cause.

Instead of 150,000 tons of chrome, Dr. Clodius was cut down to 90,000 tons, none of which would be delivered for two years (not until 1943-1944).

Instead of being permitted to reciprocate with unwanted alarm clocks, harmonicas and aspirin, Germany was required to supply the equivalent of thirteen and one-half million dollars' worth of much needed war materials. All of these war materials had to be delivered before an ounce of chrome was to be given. What a deal to drive when Hitler was counting on Moscow falling before Christmas!

The British reciprocated in a neat manner. Many of the planes in Turkey's small air arm were of German manu-

facture, and the Turks had been unable to get replacement parts from Germany. The British started shipping into Turkey dismantled parts of Heinkel bombers that had been shot down by the R.A.F., as well as two shipments of British fighter planes. Britain was doing her quiet part in preparing her neutral ally for the day of reckoning.

Hitler announced only a short time later that German troops were in sight of the capital of the Soviets. He boasted the Red Army had been annihilated. The mighty Russian bear was mortally wounded and lay bleeding at the feet of the conquering Reich. It was the signal for the Japs to move. The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor completed another hugely successful year for the Axis powers. They appeared invincible.

But the Axis had made the old-time blunder. The pages of history ring with its repetition. They had underestimated their foes. "They were counting their chickens before—" Late in December of forty-one, the Germans were retreating before the Russians along the entire eastern front. As the Japs moved from one success to another, the United States began to awaken. The British, who never know when they are licked, were catching their second wind. There were rays of hope in the dawn of 1942.

Nineteen hundred and forty-two was to be the critical year in the global struggle. It was the year in which the Axis had to win before America could really count in the conflict. The Nazis had two major objectives: knock out Russia—knock out Britain. If they attained either one, the chances of ever defeating the Axis were practically nil. Failing both, they must absolutely attain their secondary objective—the oil of Baku or Mosul, or both.

It is history how they failed in all their goals. But Turkey seemed caught in a nutcracker in early 1942 and her

neutrality became a matter of the utmost importance to the Allies. The game of international diplomacy being played at Ankara became of relatively as much importance as the battles in the Caucasus and North Africa. If von Papen could have persuaded the Turks to permit passage of Nazi troops through Turkey, the Baku and Mosul oil fields, and much more, would have been in Nazi possession with hardly a fight. This easy victory would have had staggering consequences.

Diplomatic intrigue in Ankara, akin to the old days of the Ottoman Empire, marked the critical months of 1942. Early in the year, von Papen and his wife were nearly killed by a bomb while walking along the street near the apartment occupied by the British Counsellor, Geoffrey Thompson. It knocked them flat upon the pavement and the Ambassador's pants were blown off. The body of the man who was supposed to have been carrying the bomb was blown to bits and his blood spattered all over von Papen. Miraculously, von Papen and his wife escaped death. Immediately, Nazi accusations were hurled about British-Russian intrigue. The Turks gathered up the scattered remains of the presumed bomb carrier and found German Embassy letterheads in his pocket. They definitely stated he was neither a Moslem nor a Jew. Beyond that, his identification was not revealed. Allied sources conjectured that von Papen might have secretly planned this little performance to embarrass the Turkish government. Others saw the hand of the Gestapo again trying to purge their hated von Papen and at the same time establish a perfect case upon which to exert the necessary force to get the key to the East to open her doors to the Nazi armies.

Turkish officials handled the difficult situation with great skill. Germany massed more troops in the Balkans.

A trial of suspects was held and two Russians were convicted and sentenced. Russian newspapers attacked the Turks and resentment rose in Turkey toward the Soviets. The pressure was on the Turks from many sides but they continued steadfast in their neutral course of action.

In June, American four-motored Liberators had bombed the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania. On their return to their bases, four of the bombers were forced to land in Turkey. The United States government made a present of these bombers to the Turkish air force.

In November, Inonu warned the Grand National Assembly, "We are closer to war today than at any time since the present world conflict started."

The Russian Ambassador, Sergei Vinogradov, later returned to Ankara. As Saracoglou and Vinogradov played chess in December, Turkish and Russian relationships improved. Inonu announced the release of the two Soviet citizens who had been convicted in the bombing that nearly took von Papen's life. The Nazi press roared. Did not Turkey remember what had happened to Poland? It was not healthy for a nation to flout the Axis in such a manner! Istanbul's newspaper, *Yeni Sabah*, came back sharply, "Instead of occupying themselves with dreams, the Germans had better pray to win the war. The Allies are beating Hell out of them."

History may appraise Turkey's stubborn neutrality in 1942 as saving the Allied cause and making possible a final, complete victory. To Inonu and his associates must be given the highest honors for skillful diplomacy in those perilous four years from 1938 through 1942 when a small slip, a different decision, a temporary yielding to Nazi pressure, might have spelled the loss of Turkey, and with it the loss of an Allied victory in this war.

But 1943 saw the tide of war turning. Slowly but inexorably, as the tides of the sea, the tide of war started moving against the Axis powers. The Mediterranean was opened up. America seemed able to supply the necessary materials of war, not only to supplement Russian and British production, but to care for her own needs throughout the world. She was even ready to supply the Turks many of their vital war needs, if they were ready to take part in the final stages of defeating Germany, their recognized enemy.

By the middle of March the Turkish cabinet was re-organized making it more completely pro-Ally. Five new members were selected (the eldest forty-two) putting young blood into the direction of the affairs of the country. Turkey was moving warily in the warring world completely surrounding it. Indicative of the cabinet's temper was the two-day suspension of the newspaper *Tasvir Efkar*. Its sin had been the deriding of American war aims. Another mark of the trend had been the fact that Yumis Nadi, pro-Axis publisher, had lost his seat in the Grand National Assembly.

Pressure increased on Turkey toward the end of the year to throw in her lot with the Allied Powers. Churchill earlier had proceeded to Adana, after Casablanca, to consult with the Turkish leaders. The British had done a thorough job of building modern airfields in Asia Minor for Turkey and they might be used one day by Allied planes. The British had carefully increased the fortification of the Straits. There were increasing facts known to substantiate the very strong bonds between Turkey and Great Britain. America proclaimed she was sending lend-lease aid to Turkey. The Russian press started calling for Turkey to enter the war.

Ismet Inonu, before the Grand National Assembly in October, was quoted in the American press as stating that Turkey was prepared to make greater sacrifices to "lift the great weight which oppresses humanity and prevents it from breathing freely in an atmosphere of security." Then came Eden's conferences in early November with the Turkish Foreign Minister Menemencioglou at Cairo, after the crucial meetings of the representatives of Britain, the United States, China and Russia had taken place in Moscow. Rumors favored the hope that Turkey would stop her exports of war materials to Germany, such as that 1943-1944 obligation on chrome, and would cede air bases to the Allies much as Portugal did with the Azores.

The long desired, much called for meeting of Stalin with Churchill and Roosevelt came more quickly than the world expected. Before November ended the meeting was held on Russian territory—the Russian Embassy in Teheran, Iran. Teheran is in the northern part of Iran, which was occupied by Russian troops in 1941. These facts should not be overlooked. The British and American leaders in both conferences went to the Russians, much like intercessors, asking what Stalin wanted after Nazi Germany was defeated. Possibly they received satisfactory replies—probably they did not. Nothing was reported relative to these matters. The one decision reported was that Nazi Germany would be crushed. This apparently precluded a separate peace deal by any one or two of the three. This was all to the good but could scarcely be otherwise after the havoc wrought by Germany in Russia and Great Britain, and the demands for unconditional surrender.

American newspapers headlined the subsequent conferences in Cairo between Inonu, Churchill and Roosevelt. The information given out in America stressed the

fact that Turkey had aligned herself with the Allies. This, of course, was not news to anyone who had followed Turkey's policy throughout the war and particularly her very beneficial neutrality through critical 1942. What Inonu wanted to know and what the newspapers reported Churchill and Roosevelt told him is really significant. He probably wanted to know if Britain and the United States were ready to assure Turkey of its continued sovereignty if Russia should try, now or later, to make Turkey a satellite power or force her to give up the Straits and Istanbul. The answer was reported in the *New York Times* on Dec. 8, 1943, though, naturally, there was no indication that it was a reply to such a confidential question. "While reassuring President Inonu that Moscow had no territorial aspirations on Turkey, Britain and America cautioned him to get on well with Russia, since Turkey could not count on the aid of British-American troops if a Russo-Turkish split developed." Here we have the crux of what Inonu probably wanted to know and what the American public was informed he was told.

Can anyone believe that Inonu returned to Ankara encouraged to plunge his nation into the war on the side of the Allies if he was frankly told that Turkey could not expect either Britain or America to come to her aid should Russia choose to attack and seize her strategic Straits? Such an attitude on the part of Britain (if correctly reported) must have forced Turkey inevitably to covet more than ever her neutrality in order to husband all her strength against—not Germany who definitely is being defeated—but victorious Russia, whose territorial and other ambitions still remain secreted in the Kremlin in Moscow or in the mind of Stalin. Russia appeared to have become the ominous cloud on Turkey's horizon instead of Germany.

So 1943 slipped into history with Turkey under extreme pressure from the countries which seem certain to win the war and draw up the plans for the postwar world in which Turkey wants continued independence and security from aggression. If the war is not suddenly ended in early 1944, Turkey may participate in the final blows before the knockout of Germany. She will do so, even to her detriment, as a matter of honor, if the British and Americans provide the war materials and Great Britain calls upon Turkey to fulfill her treaty obligations under the Tripartite Pact. It is a debatable question whether Britain will actually make such a request, for a friendly, strong, independent Turkey remains a valuable buffer nation to Britain's line of empire to the east.

CHAPTER TEN

Today and Tomorrow

It now becomes necessary to attempt an evaluation of Turkish strength and weaknesses. We may then conclude what may be its future sound procedure as a nation striving to maintain its sovereignty and respective place among the powerful nations of the world in the postwar era.

Turkey is a relatively large country but underpopulated in comparison with the nations of Europe. It is slightly less than 300,000 square miles. Its vastness is appreciated only when one realizes that it was larger than any country (without its colonies) in Europe, except Russia, at the beginning of 1938. It is larger than all the other Balkan countries combined (Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece). It is slightly less than one-tenth the size of the United States. Only three per cent of its land area is in Europe. But this invaluable section contains two of the country's most important cities, Istanbul and Edirne, and causes the land-encompassed Straits to be completely within the boundaries of Turkey.

In population, Turkey is not to be compared with the larger countries of Europe. Its eighteen millions are negligible alongside Germany's eighty-five millions or Russia's nearly two hundred millions. It is small in comparison

with the combined populations of the other Balkan States which total over forty millions. Because of a remarkably high birth rate and decreasing infant mortality, Turkey's population is increasing at a favorable rate compared with other countries. In another quarter of a century, it may reach and exceed thirty million people. This would approach the population of England (not including Scotland and Wales). It still would be a relatively small fraction of the total human population of the world.

To its great credit its educational and cultural advancement is proceeding unabated. For a considerable number of years, the largest item on the national budget was the expenditure for education—true in no other country in the world. Even with war threatening in 1943, Turkey took nearly 10% of its budget to continue its prodigious educational advancement, laying emphasis on the training for its important needs in agriculture and industry. Over fifteen hundred Turkish students were enrolled in institutions of higher learning abroad before the outbreak of the war. As a nation, Turkey has advanced far more in the past two decades than any nation that was once a part of the old Ottoman Empire. It holds an enviable position in the eyes of the entire Moslem world because of the manner in which it has forced the leading nations to rectify their treatment and pay their respects to its sovereignty.

The educational system is reaching a steadily increasing proportion of Turkey's population. The standard of teaching is superior to that in the old Ottoman areas. Turkey may, within a short period of years, take over the entire missionary and foreign-financed educational work within its borders. This would include the large number of French subsidized and directed schools, the few but high quality English schools, as well as the pride of the Americans, the

very fine Robert College, Istanbul Women's College and numerous missionary schools. American church members, who have been rightly proud of the contributions their educational institutions have made and are making to the advancement of Christianity and democracy in the world, would look with dismay, bewilderment and hostile resentment upon such a move. They would feel that it was unworthy of a government which professes to be democratic and progressive. The writer is fearful that the ultranationalism that still persists throughout official Turkish thinking, just as it did in the first years of the Republic, may finally lead to this action. It would be a long deliberated, conscientious decision based on a deep-seated conviction that Turkey would thereby safeguard and strengthen her unity and sovereignty. Education and religion have been instruments employed energetically in the past in the old Ottoman Empire to sow disunity and disloyalty. The Turks seem unable to conceive of their being used in any other way by foreigners in their country in the future. This narrow, nationalistic viewpoint may cost Turkey dearly in international friendship and goodwill if carried to the extreme.

Turkey developed a strong unity through the Kamalist revolution with its ethnic solidarity under the drive of "Turkey for the Turks." But, having succeeded in reducing its religious minorities to about a quarter of a million (less than one and one-half per cent of the total population) it is unfortunate if additional measures, such as the Varlik Vergesi and the discharge of all non-Moslem government employees, are used to force injustices and discrimination against these minorities. Though Turkey were to become composed entirely of Moslem Turkish citizens, maximum national unity and strength would not neces-

sarily follow. The loyalties and sacrifices called forth by the Kamalist revolution for survival cannot be expected to last indefinitely. They will need to be cultivated constantly and their moral and ethical base nurtured. Even with a strong degree of national unity, a nation with as relatively small a population and small industrial development must depend on the friendship of one or more of the powerful modern nations to help guarantee its sovereignty.

With less than ten per cent of the population engaged in industry, it is understandable that Turkey has not yet encountered the problems of an industrial society. The class of private capitalists bent on augmenting profits is relatively insignificant. There is no labor movement bent on obtaining better working conditions and higher wages. These worthy objectives are supposed to be attained by a benevolent government conscientiously concerned about the welfare of its working classes, industrial and agricultural. The bureaucrats, the engineers, and the inspectors form the controlling group in Turkey. While some of the problems of Western capitalism may be sidestepped for the moment, this economy may develop more serious problems indigenous to its nature, though not so obvious in its infancy.

Turkey's industrial development, while it has been a rapid, spectacular and for the most part state-owned and operated advancement, still is inadequate for the needs of the nation. The first five-year plan accomplished much in the selected fields—cotton textile, wool cloth, cellulose and paper, glass, copper, attar of roses, porcelain, hemp, artificial silk, semi-coke and basic chemicals. The second five-year plan, concentrating on the development of electrical power and the chemical industries, was forced along at an accelerated speed. And the separate three-year plan

for the development of the mining resources has yielded real results particularly in the production of chrome. Turkey is rich in all essential mineral deposits and, as was to be expected, oil has been discovered in the eastern provinces and production started.

The Second World War has speeded many of these projects as military necessities, aided immeasurably by British co-operation. Though detailed information is not available, for obvious military reasons, it is well known how the British have helped prepare innumerable airfields throughout the country and assisted in very heavily fortifying Thrace and the Straits. Numerous excellent roads have been constructed. Harbor installations have been made and port facilities improved.

As a modern military machine, the Turkish land and naval forces are no match for a blitz machine like the Nazis'. Their naval strength is negligible. Their modern weapons of war are foreign manufactured for the most part. Their infantrymen, who have no peer, would be woefully slaughtered if exposed to the Nazi machine in Thrace without foreign air and tank support. European Turkey is hardly defensible by the Turks alone against a major power like Germany or Russia once that nation is in complete occupation and control of Bulgaria, as Germany has been during the Second World War. Anatolia, however, is so irregular, large, roadless and in great part mountainous, that the price would be high to conquer and control it when stubbornly defended. It is doubtful if any power would choose deliberately to pay that price, particularly if Turkey were aided by another great power. Turkey has mobilized an army of one million and has another million in reserve, due to her nationalist defense policy of compulsory military training.

She has suffered severely in her economic life by the war to date. Merely keeping the large army mobilized and striving for more adequate equipment has placed a tremendous strain on the nation. And the dislocation of her international trade has been serious. On the other hand, for that price, Turkey has grown steadily stronger and better prepared should the war suddenly involve her active participation.

What Turkey needs and would want more than anything else is an international arrangement backed by force that would definitely guarantee not only to Turkey, but to all sovereign nations, freedom from aggressive action by any nation. If Turkey could secure a reliable guarantee that she would not be attacked by any nation or forced by any nation under threats of attack to accept its trade or be interfered with in its foreign policies, the officials at Ankara would feel the day of international amity had arrived. Enthusiastically, Turkey would join the present war on the side of the Allies, if victory would assure them of this.

Turkey would then have no need for the Dodecanese Islands or any other islands in the Aegean Sea not now possessed by her. Without such a guarantee, all kinds of promises are empty proposals that do not tempt the shrewd diplomats of this indomitable country.

The distrust, hatred, and fear of political and economic imperialism by the officials of Turkey are justified by experience. The Turks cannot but be suspicious of Russia and Great Britain as they face the final phases of the war and the arrangements of the postwar world. Russia has indicated its determination to reincorporate large areas that were taken from it after the last war. Churchill has spoken unequivocally to Parliament for all the world to understand, "I am not Prime Minister to preside over the

liquidation of the British Empire." It is the common effort of radio analysts and columnists in this country to guess what each country expects to get out of this war in the way of spoils. Even the Greek-American Society in New York, called The American Paneperic League, in the introduction to its pamphlet published in June, 1943, states that Greece should be given extensive territorial additions in the peace settlement. This is but the old peace pattern, "To the victors belong the spoils."

Few students of international affairs envisage an adequate world organization from the October, 1943 conference of British, United States, Russian Foreign Ministers and Chinese Ambassador in Moscow, nor from the November meeting of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. Rather it would appear from the meager releases that some limited agreement may have been arrived at between the powers as to their relative spheres of influence in the different parts of the world. It would also appear that the Balkans fall within the Russian sphere and the Near and Middle East within the British sphere. Turkey then would hold the old in between position where both Russia and Britain would play for her favor.

The rather ambitious hopes the Turks had for a strong Balkan bloc through the Balkan Pact were rudely shattered by the penetrations of Hitlerite Germany and the Second World War. If the Balkans are to be a part of the Russian sphere of influence, the Turks cannot hope for its accomplishment in the postwar period.

Similarly, if Great Britain is to have all of the Near and Middle East as part of its sphere of influence (and where does France fit into this picture with its mandate of Syria?) Turkey must deal realistically with the new situation con-

fronting her. Neither Turkey nor the rest of the world outside the four world governing powers, self-elected through prospective military victory, can hope for the degree of sovereignty they want or have a right to expect. Indeed history furnishes ample evidence that small nations have had no real sovereignty in the past, despite frequent fraudulent claims of the Great Powers to nonintervention in these nations' internal as well as international affairs.

It would appear that Great Britain will be the one most vulnerable of the quartet of leading world powers of the postwar era. Russia is a continuous land mass of fairly united people in no danger of internal disintegration. The same is true of the United States. It remains to be seen whether the Chinese can be unified into a powerful, industrialized nation. But Great Britain is the ruler of many subject peoples chafing under its rule, watching and planning for the day that they may win their sovereignty. If history continues to repeat itself (and one can gamble on its doing so to a very great degree) the other three may not only fail to prevent but may even encourage the breakdown and final collapse of the British Empire. The speed with which this may occur is conjectural but the trend appears incontrovertable.

The purpose of this prognostication is to try to understand what possibly dangerous course the realistic, discerning Turks may choose in the years ahead. It can be taken for granted that they will jealously and rightly strive to keep as free as possible from the domination of both Great Britain and Russia, while doing everything possible to maintain close friendship and collaboration. But they must inevitably place their greatest trust in Great Britain as the power most likely to come quickly to their aid should

their sovereignty be jeopardized. On the basis of the previous prognostication on the postwar period, it would therefore seem that Turkey would have to depend on the one that may be much weaker in another quarter of a century.

The author has had to face the criticism that he is an idealist, the inference being that, therefore, he is not realistic. This book may serve as a refutation. Persons who have read the manuscript have been surprised at the harsh criticism of British diplomacy along with most of the international diplomacy at The Sublime Porte and at Ankara. Many who have read the book through to these final pages may feel convinced the author is obnoxiously Anglophobic. He does not consider himself irrationally idealistic nor anti-British. On the contrary, he is entirely too pro-British for the majority of Americans. He has had the sincere friendship and close co-operation of Britishers from Istanbul to Shanghai who have taught him to realize the importance of combining with unselfish service self-centeredness sufficient for self-preservation.

He has felt compelled to paint some of these historical truths in their startlingly crimson hues because the Utopian dreamers deceive themselves and others by blueprinting a lasting and durable peace based on the immediate attainment of justice and equality. They have never learned the lessons that cry out from the pages of history. They exemplify the history teacher's apt remark: "History teaches us that we learn not from history."

The arrangement of the postwar world, for which countless thousands die daily, will be made by representatives of the victorious nations. These representatives will be activated primarily in all decisions by the self-interest of the nations they represent. They will not be sent to the peace table with loftier instructions. Lord Palmerston, ca-

pable diplomat for Britain in the nineteenth century, spoke accurately and dispassionately when he said: "Britain has no eternal enemies or perpetual friends. Only her interests are eternal and perpetual." This has been basic to all British diplomacy. Other nations have studied and tried to copy it as best they could, but still recognize the British as master statesmen.

Recognition of this selfish basis for co-operation is fundamental. There is sufficient selfish interest for each great power in the world to relinquish its sovereign prerogatives to wage war. It is now essential to world progress for rampant imperialisms to give way to more equitable, non-discriminatory co-operation. But it will be at best a slow, difficult process to work out. Immediate justice and equality throughout the world are no more obtainable than justice and equality within any nation. This is no excuse for not pressing constantly for a greater degree of both. But the continuation of progress must start from the point where we find ourselves at the close of the war. This is realism.

The British have contributed immeasurably to the advancement of the world. Much of the finer texture of our civilization has been woven by them. It is unfortunate that most Americans have not sufficient knowledge of history to appreciate this fact about Great Britain. The author heartily dislikes the prognostication he has made about the future and the British Empire. He feels very strongly that American and world interests require Americans to understand the shortcomings of Britain and still co-operate fully with her as she plays her vital role. The British Empire is evolving from a dominant rule of subject peoples into a strong commonwealth of nations. It can be a very strong stabilizing factor for a long era of

peace if American strength is thrown with it as the best possible partner (not precluding others) in the attainment of a steadily advancing world order based on the sincere desire to achieve justice through law and order.

The people of Turkey would rejoice with most of the rest of the world if such intelligent collaboration between the two great English-speaking nations came to pass. Failing this unusual opportunity that is now before the winning nations, the progress of the world will be slowed and the position of Turkey will be more uncertain. One can be sure the Turks will continue to show a fair, firm and fighting spirit that will always stand them well in an uncertain or unfriendly world.

